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The present study explored data presentation and human cognition with the 
objective of improving electronic Decision Support Systems (DSS). Computers have 
been used as tools for decision support for over 60 years, with the intent to supplement or 
replace human cognition. However, electronic computing has failed to reliably replace 
human cognition in complex domains. The suboptimal properties of the data and 
complexities of the domain often require human interpretation and intervention. Human 
interpretation relies on experience, values, intuition, insight and learning; which can lead 
to shortcuts or heuristics. Heuristics in the correct context can be economical and 
effective in solving many problems. When heuristics fail the results are labeled as 
cognitive biases or errors. Biases all share the elements of structuring incorrect or 
inappropriate models or hypotheses and/or insufficient consideration of the data.  Most 
biases can be linked to confirmation bias – which is manifested by searches for and 
consideration of only confirming data.  De-biasing techniques share the concept of 
shifting cognitive processing from an automatic associative mode to a more deliberate, 
conscious rule-based mode. This study used a modified Wason 2-4-6 task that combined 
methods of, 1) increased salience through data visualization with 2) appealing to the rule-
based system through task instructions. The results indicate that neither increased 
salience nor instructions ensure increased search sufficiency, efficiency or decision 
accuracy. However, this study provides insight into the perceived value of evidence and 
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four potential limitations related to self-directed searches: 1) The selection of necessary 
disconfirming evidence cannot be assumed, regardless of the perceived value of 
disconfirming evidence. 2) The selection of sufficient evidence does not ensure accuracy; 
however, 3) insufficient selection of disconfirming evidence results in lower accuracy. 4) 
Ambiguous evidence is considered more valuable than potentially disconfirming 
evidence. Implications for the design of decision support systems are presented along 
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Computers as Tools for Decision Support 
Since the early days of electronic computing in the 1940s and 1950s, researchers 
have worked to replace or supplement human cognition with Decision Support Systems 
(DSS) and Natural Language Processing (NLP); (Dick, Steen, & Detmer, 1997; Liddy, 
2001; Turban & Aronson, 2000).  No universally accepted definition exists for either 
DSS or NLP; however, the term Decision Support System can be used to describe any 
electronic system that supports decision making (Turban & Aronson, 2000); and NLP 
refers to computerized approaches to analyzing text with the intent “to accomplish 
human-like language processing” (Liddy, 2001).   
The success of DSS and NLP in complex environments is complicated by data 
characteristics such as conflicting, ambiguous, and excessive data with issues of 
availability, timeliness and credibility. The suboptimal properties of existing data are 
recognized in healthcare where even the definition of evidence-based medicine “makes 
allowances for missing, incomplete, or low-quality evidence [italics added]” (Sim et al., 
2001). 
Unmet Expectations   
Researchers and developers continue the struggle to provide DSS systems that 
reliably replace human cognition in complex domains such as healthcare, weather 





2012; Sittig et al., 2010; Wright et al., 2011). For over 60 years the focus has been on the 
capabilities of the electronic system. Perhaps the time has come to focus more on human 
cognition, which requires the development of electronic solutions structured to support 
human cognitive strengths and overcome cognitive deficiencies (Hollnagel & Woods, 
2005). 
Heuristics and Biases 
Cognitive strengths can be associated with cognitive deficiencies. Experience, 
values, intuition, insight and learning lead to heuristics or cognitive shortcuts (Simon & 
Newell, 1958).  When applied in the correct context, heuristics are economical, effective 
and are often the result of domain expertise; many real world problems are effectively 
solved using heuristics (Gigerenzer, 2007; Klayman & Ha, 1987).  However, when 
heuristics fail they are labeled as cognitive biases or errors, using terms such as, 
gambler’s fallacy, premature cognitive closure, representativeness, availability, and 
confirmation biases (Croskerry, 2002; Simon, 1956; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
Whatever their label, biases all share the elements of, a) structuring incorrect or 
inappropriate models and hypotheses and/or, b) insufficient consideration of the data.  
Using Nickerson’s (1998) definition of confirmation bias as the “unwitting selectivity in 
the acquisition and use of evidence…[italics added]” it appears most biases can be linked 
to confirmation bias.  Confirmation bias manifests itself by searches for only confirming 
information, that are insufficient and lead to lower decision accuracy (Nickerson, 1998; 
Wason, 1960).  Poor outcomes due to incorrect models or hypotheses and or insufficient 
consideration of data are ubiquitous.  Many researchers report poor outcomes from 





propose de-biasing techniques (Booth, Carroll, Ilott, Low, & Cooper, 2013; Lilienfeld, 
Ammirati, & Landfield, 2009). The debiasing techniques that do exist share the concept 
of shifting cognitive processing from an automatic, associative mode to a more 
deliberate, conscious rulebased mode (Lilienfeld et al., 2009). 
Dual Processing 
Two Systems 
  At least since Aristotle, human cognition has been thought of as two systems or 
to consist of dual processing: An automatic, unconscious, fast system, which includes 
heuristics; and a rule-based, conscious, deliberative system (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 
2011; Sloman, 1996). The use of dual processing systems is not limited to any domain, 
problem or context and depends on the “reasoner’s knowledge, skill and experience” 
(Sloman, 1996).  Multiple definitions and descriptions in dual process theory have 
resulted in many labels for the two systems; including, Automatic and Controlled, 
Heuristic/Intuitive and Systematic/Analytic, Associative and Rule-based; or simply 
System 1 and System 2 or Type 1 and Type 2 (see Evans, 2008, p. 257).   
Researchers typically agree the two systems work in parallel with competition for 
controlling behavior and decisions (Barrouillet, 2011; Evans, 2003; Kahneman, 2011; 
Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2011). However, the diverse descriptions and 
development of theories of the two systems continue and many unknowns remain when 
defining neural correlates (Barrouillet, 2011; Evans, 2011; Tsujii & Watanabe, 2009).  
For consistency, the two systems are referenced hereafter using Sloman’s (1996) terms of 





and 2 and are at least as explanatory as labels such as Automatic and Controlled, 
Heuristic/Intuitive and Systematic/Analytic. 
One objective of the present research was to build on the concept that shifting 
cognitive processing from an automatic, associative mode to a more deliberate, conscious 
rule-based mode may be crucial to overcoming confirmation bias.  Therefore, the 
question became when and how to facilitate that shift in the context of decision support.   
Switching Between Systems 
  To improve human cognition by reducing confirmation bias, it may be important 
to understand when to support associative reasoning and when and how to facilitate 
switching to more rule-based processing.  There are at least two broad approaches to 
supporting associative reasoning and facilitating a switch to rule-based processing: 1) 
Data visualizations to provide effective and efficient explanations of the data (Kosslyn, 
1989; Tufte, 2000) and to increase awareness of data characteristics; and, 2) training or 
explicit instruction to recognize errors, structure appropriate hypotheses, and/or conduct 
deliberate, methodical searches and analyses.  These two approaches are discussed in 
detail. 
Data Visualization 
Data visualizations are often intended to provide effective and efficient 
explanations and support decision making.  Data visualizations are typically thought of as 
the use of charts and graphs that show data trends and groupings.  These data 
visualizations can be effective; however, they often do not include representing 
characteristics of the data such as, temporal qualities, precision, assumed accuracy, data 





the current task.  An overview of work promoting data visualization revealed a common 
focus on a limited set of principles and techniques: How relevant data can be made 
salient; warnings that graphical displays must be portrayed so that comparisons can be 
accurate and not mislead; and simplicity for easy comprehension (see Few, 2006; 
Kosslyn, 1989; Tufte, 2000; Wainer, 2005). Although this overview was not exhaustive, 
it is surprising to find that the authors never addressed and only rarely acknowledged 
issues with data characteristics that affect the user’s perception of data quality, ambiguity 
or uncertainty as important elements. One exception is a book on graphing history and 
principles where the author acknowledged, “The focus of this book has been on 
displaying data, I have spent very little effort discussing the quality of what is being 
displayed” (Wainer, 2005, p. 142)  This void is notable since data quality, ambiguity and 
uncertainty can be important to determine the relevance of the data to the user’s task 
(Lapinski, 2009; Puvathingal & Hantula, 2012). Only recently have some researchers 
started to consider how to represent data characteristics that affect quality, uncertainty 
and ambiguity (MacEachren et al., 2005; Pang, Wittenbrink, & Lodha, 1997; Zuk & 
Carpendale, 2006). Consequentially, there is very little understanding of the effect on 
human cognition of representing data characteristics.   
Zuk and Carpendale (2007) suggest that increasing awareness of data 
characteristics may lead to consideration of more causes and reduce biases. Awareness of 
data characteristics may be raised by increasing the salience of data characteristics, 
especially those characteristics that are relevant to the current hypothesis or task goals. 
Salience has been defined as how perceptually distinctive the information is in the 





Hastie, 1998).  This perceptual distinctiveness is achieved by stimulus-driven or bottom-
up processing which is based on display properties such as size, position, line orientation, 
sound levels, stimulus-onset, or color hue and intensity; all of which can affect the search 
for information (Huang & Pashler, 2005; Nothdurft, 1993; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; 
Treisman, Gelade, & Yantis, 2000).  
Natural Language Processing (NLP) tools have been created to electronically 
annotate text to increase the salience of some data characteristics (see Chen & Styler., 
2013; South et al., 2012).  In healthcare, electronically annotating or tagging evidence 
may help identify patients with certain medical conditions or potentially diagnose a 
condition in a single patient.  Evidence may be annotated in any number of ways; 
including highlighting text by, for example, using different colors to identify and 
categorize data as supporting, ambiguous or disconfirming in relation to a specific 
medical condition. More specifically, consider the medical diagnosis of pneumonia; the 
evidence in a patient’s records such as the symptoms of cough, shortness of breath, or 
chest pains, may be annotated as supporting a pneumonia diagnosis while other evidence 
such as nausea, vomiting or diarrhea may be annotated as ambiguous.  A clear chest x-ray 
can be annotated as disconfirming the diagnosis of pneumonia. Using computer software 
to find and annotate evidence as supporting, ambiguous or disconfirming (using colors or 
other methods to differentiate categories and increase salience) may lead to more efficient 
and sufficient searches with greater decision accuracy.  Thus, the question becomes, can 
increased salience of data characteristics reduce confirmation bias and thereby improve 
performance; perhaps by appropriately supporting associative processing or facilitating a 






A second approach to reducing confirmation bias is to encourage rule-based 
processing with instructions to recognize errors, structure appropriate hypotheses, and/or 
conduct deliberate, methodical searches (Edward R. Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004; 
Edward R Hirt & Markman, 1995; Lilienfeld et al., 2009; Spengler, Strohmer, Dixon, & 
Shivy, 1995). As noted earlier, structuring incorrect models and hypotheses, and 
insufficient consideration of the data are core elements and failure points of biases. These 
failure points are not isolated or separate and distinct processes; without an accurate 
hypothesis the value of the data is not interpreted correctly and therefore the wrong data 
are considered or the correct data are not given sufficient or accurate consideration 
(Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1970). Two types of instructions for overcoming confirmation 
bias have been considered, creation of multiple hypotheses and delaying judgment while 
considering more data – especially disconfirming data (see Lilienfeld et al., 2009).  
Many practices have been proposed for encouraging creation of multiple 
hypotheses, such as, “consider-the-opposite” (Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984) and later 
Hirt and Markham’s (1995) proposal to consider any possible outcome, not just the 
opposite strategies.  In medicine considering any possible outcome is supported by the 
concept of differential diagnosis.  Differential diagnosis is related to a “hypothetico-
deductive method” where doctors are encouraged to iteratively consider evidence using 
bottom up deductive processes to develop hypotheses then seek more evidence (e.g., 
laboratory and radiology tests), to make a diagnosis (Croskerry, 2002).   
The second type of instruction to reduce confirmation bias – delaying judgment 





reasoning. Clinical counselors who delay judgment in diagnosis have been shown to be 
more accurate; perhaps due to forming hypotheses that are “repeatedly subjected to 
rejection” based on additional evidence (Spengler et al., 1995).  The question is, can 
instructions to structure appropriate hypotheses and sufficiently consider data, reduce 
confirmation bias and thereby improve performance?   
Overview of Experiments 
The present research included three experiments.  All experiments explored 
means to reduce or to overcome cognitive biases by promoting, a) the generation of 
appropriate models/hypotheses and, b) sufficient consideration of the data.   The first 
experimental design combined increased salience of data characteristics with instructions.  
This study addressed the following two questions: Can increased salience of data 
characteristics reduce confirmation bias and thereby improve performance; and, can 
instructions to structure appropriate hypotheses and consider data sufficiently, reduce 
confirmation bias and thereby improve performance?   
The objectives of the second experiment were to delve deeper into the perceived 
value and consideration of data; and continue exploration of increased salience of data 
characteristics. The third experiment removed the ability for self-directed searches by 
presenting the data in a specific order, and did not present ambiguous data. The effect of 
presenting sufficient disconfirming evidence was explored in the analyses of all 
experiment conditions; specifically considering the following question: How does the 







Wason 2-4-6 Task   
All approaches in the present research were implemented using adaptations of the 
Wason 2-4-6 task. Variations of the Wason 2-4-6 task have been used extensively to 
study hypothesis generation, and confirming and disconfirming search strategies (see 
Cherubini, Castelvecchio, & Cherubini, 2005; Gorman & Gorman, 1984; Mumma & 
Wilson, 1995). The original Wason 2-4-6 task was to discover the rule governing the 
sequence of three numbers – a triple.  Participants were presented with a triple and asked 
to discover the rule that described the relationship between the three numbers.  Next, the 
participants proposed triples to test their hypotheses on what the rule could be; then 
received feedback on whether or not the proposed triple adhered to the rule describing the 
original triple.  The participants generated triples until they were confident they had 
discovered the rule; they then stated the rule and received feedback on whether their rule 
was correct.  If incorrect, the participant formulated another hypothesis for the rule and 
generated more triples.  This process continued until the participants discovered the rule, 
abandoned the task or until time expired.  The original Wason 2-4-6 task presented the 
triple “2-4-6” where the rule was “three numbers in increasing order of magnitude” 
(Wason, 1960).   
The Wason 2-4-6 task seems simple; however, it is rather difficult.  In Wason’s 





declaration of a rule; another 10 participants (34%) discovered the rule on their second 
attempt.  Eight participants (28%) never discovered the rule.  
The central element of a successful discovery of the rule is to seek disconfirming 
evidence.  Therefore, the process of rule generation in a variation of the Wason 2-4-6 task 
is well-suited to study methods for overcoming confirmation bias; since triples can be 
definitively labeled as conforming, nonconforming, or partially conforming to a rule. In 
addition, the Wason 2-4-6 task provides the benefits of unambiguous measures for search 
strategies, sufficiency, and efficiency and decision accuracy.  
General Design  
All three experiments were similar in that, consistent with the original Wason 2-4-
6 task, participants were asked to discover a rule related to sequences of numbers 
(triples); (see Figure 1).  However, unlike the original Wason 2-4-6 task, instead of a 
single trial with one triple and associated rule, participants were given 15 trials; each 
relating to a different rule (see Table 1).  In addition, the method used here also differed 
from the classic Wason 2-4-6 task in that the participants did not actively generate triples; 
instead, participants selected or viewed up to 4 or 6 triples for each trial.  Some of the 
triples conformed to the rule, some partially conformed to the rule and other triples did 
not conform to the rule. These data characteristics of conforming, partially conforming 
and not conforming are analogous to evidence being confirming, ambiguous or 
disconfirming a hypothesis or diagnosis.  After selecting and considering the triples 
participants then stated what they thought the rule could be. 
The structure of the rules was consistent across all three experiments. The rules 






Table 1. Rules for the 15 Trials 
Trial Rule 
1 A difference of 1 must separate adjacent numbers. 
2 A difference of 0 or 1 must separate adjacent numbers.  
3 Numbers must alternate odd/even. 
4 Ascending odd numbers. 
5 Odd numbers where a difference of 2 must separate adjacent numbers. 
6 Ascending numbers where a difference of 3 must separate adjacent numbers. 
7 Descending odd numbers. 
8 Any even number. 
9 Ascending numbers which must alternate odd/even. 
10 Descending numbers where a difference of 2 must separate adjacent numbers. 
11 Descending numbers. 
12 Even numbers where a difference of 4 must separate adjacent numbers. 
13 Even numbers where a difference of 2 or 6 must separate adjacent numbers. 
14 Any odd number. 
15 Descending numbers where a difference of 2 or 3 must separate adjacent numbers. 
 
  





between adjacent numbers; and/or 3) the sequence being ascending or descending.  For 
example, the triple 6-4-2 would conform to the rule “even numbers descending by 2;” 
which includes all three patterns. In the instructions, the participants were cautioned that 
the conforming sequences could include patterns that were not required for the rule; and 
to limit the rule to only the required patterns.  For example, the rule for the triple 6-4-2 
could be “any even number.”  Determining what patterns to include in or exclude from 
the rule required consideration of other conforming and nonconforming triples.  The rule 
was given to the participant after every trial (see Figure 2).  Participants completed the 
trials individually. 
After completing the 15 trials, demographic and academic data were collected for 
each participant (see Figure 3): Gender, age, GPA and whether they had completed, or 
were currently enrolled in specific psychology classes (i.e., Psych 1010 – General 
Psychology, Psych 2010 – Psych as a Science and Profession, Psych 2125 – Everyday 
Decision Making, Psych 3120 – Cognitive Psychology, Psych 3171 – Human Factors).  
Participation in these courses was of interest because the courses may have included 
discussions of the Wason 2-4-6 task and thus provided some training to consider 
disconfirming evidence. 











General Data Coding 
Rules 
Research assistants coded the participants’ responses for analysis. There were two 
parts to coding the rules, “hits” and “false positives.” When participants correctly 
identified a pattern in the rule it was counted as a “hit.”  Rules consisted of one or two 
patterns: Six rules had only 1 pattern; nine rules had 2 patterns (see Table 1). To 
normalize identifying patterns in the rule to a maximum value of “1” per trial, the number 
of hits was divided by the total patterns in that rule. When participants included a pattern 
in the rule that should have been eliminated (a distracter pattern) the pattern was counted 
as a “false positive.”  
Because participants entered free form text when defining the rule, the 
participants’ descriptions of the rules varied. To ensure reliability of coding, each 
participant’s responses were independently coded by at least two research assistants.  All 
coding was reviewed independently and differences between coders’ counts of hits and 
false positives were investigated and resolved for consistency.  For example, the rule for 
trial 12 was “Even numbers where a difference of 4 must separate adjacent numbers.”  
Participant 231 entered “even numbers ascending must have difference of 4 between 
adjacent numbers.”  There were three possible patterns types (odd or even numbers, 
ascending or descending, the difference between the numbers) that could be counted as 
hits or false positives.  For this example having “even numbers” and “difference of 4” 
were counted as two “hits” while the “ascending” pattern was counted as a “false 





hit, while another RA coded the participant’s attempt correctly.  Discrepancies between 
RA coding were identified and fixed. 
Selection Sequence 
The selection sequence was also coded for each trial per participant.  For 
example, CCPPNN equates to a selection pattern of selecting both conforming triples 
(CC), then both partially conforming triples (PP) and finally both nonconforming triples 
(NN).  Because coding the selection sequence was based on the data captured by the 






EXPERIMENT 1 - INCREASED SALIENCE AND TASK  
INSTRUCTIONS 
Introduction 
The first experiment combined increased salience of data characteristics with task 
instructions.  The experiment addressed two potentially complementary questions. The 
first question was, can increased salience of data characteristics reduce confirmation bias 
and thereby improve performance?  More specifically, with the hypothesis that color can 
be more effective than text in identifying characteristics of evidence, and therefore, 
replace text for increased search efficiency, sufficiency and decision accuracy. 
Data visualization may not be enough to ensure sufficient consideration of the 
data. The second question for this experiment was, can instructions to structure 
appropriate hypotheses and sufficiently consider data, reduce confirmation bias and 
thereby improve performance?  The two types of instructions for overcoming 
confirmation bias were introduced earlier – creation of multiple hypotheses and delaying 
judgment while considering more data, especially disconfirming data.  Both types of 
instructions implicitly address structuring hypotheses and sufficient consideration of the 
data.  The emphasis in past research has been on structuring the hypothesis, and 
secondarily on searching for disconfirming data.  The search for disconfirming data is 
necessary for considering disconfirming data.  Therefore, instructions to search for and 





multiple hypotheses.  The hypothesis for this experiment was that instructions to perform 
a disconfirming search are more effective than instructions to think of as many rules as 
possible. Compared to an emphasis on structuring hypotheses, an explicit emphasis on 
searching for disconfirming evidence might promote a switch to rule-based processing 
and increase sufficient consideration of the data (measured by selection of confirming 
and disconfirming evidence).  Sufficient consideration of the data was expected to result 
in increased decision accuracy. 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were recruited from the University of Utah psychology undergraduate 
student participant pool.  Each participant individually completed one experiment in one 
session. Participants received one hour of credit towards a psychology course 
requirement.  Data were analyzed from 80 participants ranging in age from 18 to 43 years 
(M = 23).  Forty-eight participants were female (60%) and 32 were male (40%). 
Exclusions 
All potential participants were tested for color vision and their data were excluded 
from analyses if they could not distinguish between the colors used to identify data 
characteristics.  In addition, 4 potential participants did not provide a rule for every trial; 
therefore, their data were incomplete and excluded from analysis. 
Design 
The 2x2 between-subjects design included visualization (text labels or color 





other independent variable.  These variables are described in more detail in the following 
section. 
Visualization 
The visualization conditions were used to examine the following question: Can 
increased salience of data characteristics reduce confirmation bias and thereby improve 
performance, with the hypothesis that color can be more effective than text in identifying 
characteristics of evidence, and therefore, can replace text for increased search efficiency, 
sufficiency and decision accuracy.   
Six boxes containing triples were presented in a column – triples were initially not 
visible.  When selected by the participant each box revealed a triple.  Each of the boxes 
for the triples were identified as “conforming,” “nonconforming,” or “partially 
conforming” to a rule using one of two methods: 1) Text labels or, 2) color coding – 
green, yellow and red – to match rule conformation (i.e., green = conforming; yellow = 
partially conforming; red = nonconforming); (see Figure 4 and Figure 5).  The colors 
green, yellow and red were chosen because of their common associations: Green with go 
or yes; yellow with caution or maybe; and red with stop or no. 
The boxes containing triples were positioned in pseudo-random order, with a 
different order for every trial but consistent between conditions for each trial (i.e., the 
positions in the list for conforming and nonconforming triples differed between trials 1 
through 15; however, the order of conforming and nonconforming triples in trials 1 




















Table 2. Experiments 1 and 2 - List Order for the 15 Trials 


















The use of different instructions explored the question, can instructions to 
structure appropriate hypotheses and sufficiently consider data reduce confirmation bias 
and thereby improve performance?  The hypothesis was that instructions to perform a 
disconfirming search are more effective than instructions to think of as many rules 
possible. Expected results were increased search efficiency, sufficiency and decision 
accuracy. 
Two versions of the instructions were provided in the between-subjects design. 
The first instructed participants to think of rules and then to perform a disconfirming 
search: “Discover the rule by thinking of rules that could apply to the conforming 
sequences then use the nonconforming and/or partially conforming sequences to test the 
rule(s).”  The second instructed participants to generate as many rules as possible with no 





you can that could apply to the conforming sequences then determine which one best 
describes the conforming sequences.”  
Procedure 
Upon entry into the laboratory, participants were greeted and informed consent 
was obtained for the IRB approved study.  Because the selection of triples potentially 
required discriminating between different colors, all potential participants were given a 
color vision screening test.  Potential participants who could not discriminate between 
colors were assigned participant IDs that identified them as having color vision 
deficiencies and their data were excluded from all analyses.  Participants completed the 
tasks individually.  A custom software application introduced participants to the task, 
presented instructions, and recorded responses.  
Using the software application, a research assistant (RA) logged in and entered a 
predetermined unique participant ID.  The participant ID determined the participant’s 
experimental condition. The RA directed the participant to read the instructions aloud.  
Participants were encouraged to ask questions while they completed an example trial.  
The example trial was used to train the participant on the task, address questions and 
assess the participant’s understanding of the task. Participants generally understood the 
task; however, a common question was whether the rule could include more than one 
pattern.  RAs were instructed to answer questions as “yes” or “no” or by rereading the 
relevant instructions on the computer display.  A pilot of the study showed that rereading 
task instructions and pausing to allow participants to think about the task resolved any 





Participants interacted with the application by clicking on six initially empty 
boxes.  The boxes were identified, either with text labels or by color, as containing triples 
that 1) conformed to the rule, 2) did not conform to the rule, or, 3) partially conformed to 
the rule (two triples of each type).  After selecting a box a triple appeared in the box. 
Participants were able to select the boxes in any order and could select up to all six boxes.  
Text on the screen directed the participants to click “Continue” when they discovered the 
rule.  Selecting the “Continue” button caused the boxes with the triples to disappear and 
displayed the text, “Write the rule you think defines the sequence. Click ‘Continue’ when 
you are finished.” Participants entered the rule in a text box (see Figure 6).  Selecting the 
“Continue” button caused the boxes and the triples that were selected to reappear and 
displayed the text, “Write the strategy you used to determine the rule.  Click ‘Continue’ 
when you are finished.”  Participants entered the strategy they used to determine the rule.  
Selecting the “Continue” button caused the correct rule to appear (see Figure 2).  After 
dismissing the dialog box containing the correct rule, the screen was reset to the next 
trial. After 15 trials the participants answered demographic questions (i.e., age, gender, 
GPA and classes taken); (see Figure 3).  
Measurements  
The following measurements were recorded in a database for each trial performed 
by a participant: 
Time. The time was recorded for participant actions: 
 When each triple was selected (made visible)  






   





 When the participant selected “Continue” after entering the rule and the 
strategy for each trial (see Figure 7) 
These measurements allowed comparisons of the time for trials between and 
within participants, and for each experimental condition.  Search efficiency was 
measured by time. 
Rule. Participants were instructed to enter what they thought the rule could be 
after selecting up to six triples. For every trial the conforming triples contained one or 
two patterns related to a rule and at least one other pattern that served as a distracter.  The 
distracter pattern(s) could be eliminated from the rule using other triples (see Table 3).   
Search sequence. When each triple was selected and made visible the type of 
sequence – conforming, nonconforming or partially conforming – was recorded as well 
as the time of selection.  This facilitated determining the search sequence.  
Strategy.  The participant entered a description of the strategy they used to 
determine each rule.  The example trial displayed the following text as a description of 
potential strategies (see Figure 7): “There are multiple strategies for determining the rule, 
one strategy is to look at just the first conforming sequence (3-5-7) and think of possible 
rules for that sequence, (e.g., the rule could be odd numbers with adjacent numbers 
differing by 2 and/or ascending numbers). Looking at the next conforming sequence tells 
you the rule can’t limit the numbers to odd only.”  For the experimental conditions with 
the disconfirm instruction the text attempted to encourage the participant to disconfirm 
their hypothesized rule by continuing with, “You could hypothesize that the rule is 
ascending numbers differing by 2; then check the nonconforming and/or partially 











Table 3. Patterns in the Rule and Possible Distracters 
Trial Hit (part of rule) Possible 
Hits 
False Positive (distracter) – disconfirm with: 
Conforming Nonconforming 
1 Diff 1 1  Ascending-N2 ; 
Odd/even/odd-N2  
2 Diff 0 or 1 1  Descending-N1 
3 Odd/even/odd 1 Diff 1 - C2 Ascending-N1 
4 Ascending, odd 2  Diff 2,4-N1 
5 Diff 2, odd 2 Descending - C2   
6 Ascending, diff 3 2 Odd/even/odd - C2 Odd/even/odd-N1; 
Even/odd/even-N2 
7 Descending, odd 2 Diff 4 then 2 - C2 Diff 4,2-N1 N2 
8 Even 1 Descending - C1 




2 Diff 3,1 - C2  
10 Descending, diff 2 2 All odd - C2 All odd or even-N1 N2 
11 Descending 1 Diff 2 - C2 Diff 2-N2; odd-N2 
12 Diff 4, even 2 Ascending - C2 Ascending-N1 
13 Diff 2 or 6, even 2  Descending-N2 
14 Odd  1  Diff 2,4-N1; descending-
N2 
15 Descending, diff 2 
or 3 







rule is just ascending numbers.”  The experimental conditions with the many rules 
instruction continued instead with, “You could hypothesize that the rule is simply 
ascending numbers.”  For all experimental conditions, the example strategy text 
concluded with, “Other strategies may be more or less effective; you are encouraged to 
develop your own strategies.” The purpose of the example text was to describe what was 
meant by a “strategy” without specifying what the participant’s strategy should be.  The 
text box where participants typed their responses allowed sufficient input for all 
responses – no responses were truncated.  Responses were saved as plain text. 
Data Coding 
The “hits” and “false positives” in the participant rule responses and the selection 
sequence were coded as described in the General Data Coding section.  
Times 
All times were calculated electronically using values captured and stored by the 
software application. Efficiency was judged by how much time the participant spent 
determining the rule.  Time measurement for each trial started when the trial was 
presented and ended when the participant selected the “Continue” button to enter the rule. 
Data Exclusion  
Unfortunately, the text labels for trial 14 were incorrectly labeled in a version of 
the software application.  Because this affected the responses for some participants, the 
data for trial 14 were excluded from analyses for all participants.  The rule for trial 14 





Therefore, the trial 14 data were somewhat redundant and exclusion of trial 14 data was 
unlikely to have affected the overall results. 
Results  
Accuracy 
A two-way ANOVA of the data showed no difference in accuracy for identifying 
patterns in the rule based on the use of text or color to identify data characteristics, F(1, 
76) = .22, p = .64 (Text, M = 9.5 (67.9%), SD = 1.85; Color, M = 9.3 (66.4%), SD = 
2.22).  On average, participants failed to eliminate 6.58 distracter patterns (SD = 2.68) in 
the Text condition and 7.43 distracter patterns (SD = 3.56) in the Color condition.  
Resulting in no statistical difference in eliminating distracter patterns between any of the 
conditions, F (1, 76) = 1.42, p = .24.  
Instructing participants to perform a disconfirming search was not more effective 
than instructing participants to think of as many rules as possible:  The differing 
instructions did not affect identifying the possible 23 patterns in the rules over the 14 
trials, F(1, 76) = .59, p = .44 (Disconfirm, M = 15.95 (69.3%), SD = 2.88; Many Rules, M 
= 15.39 (66.9%), SD =3.61).  Nor did the different instructions affect eliminating 
distracter patterns over the 14 trials, F(1, 76) = .01, p = .92 (Disconfirm, M = 6.96, SD = 
3.13; Many Rules, M = 7.04, SD = 3.23).   
There were no significant interactions between the visual (color or text) and non-
visual (instructions) conditions for either identifying patterns in the rule (hits), F(1, 76) = 






Overall there was a relationship between identifying patterns in the rule and 
eliminating distracter patterns.  An increase in identifying patterns related to the rule 
correlates with eliminating distracter patterns, τb = -.27 p = .001.   
Time Efficiency 
 Three participants’ time totals were outliers of more than two standard deviations 
above the mean and therefore excluded from time analyses (i.e., excluded total time 
values that exceeded 1700 seconds; 1700 seconds is more than two standard deviations 
above the mean of 809 seconds).   
There was no difference between conditions in time required to determine a rule, 
F(3, 73) = .29, p = .84 (see Table 4). 
Selection Sequence 
As previously described, the triples were initially not visible; however, six boxes 
were identified by text or color as containing triples that were conforming, partially 
conforming or nonconforming to a rule.  Participants could select up to six triples in any 
order.  The top three selection orders accounted for 67.8% of all searches: 1) Selection of 
items from top to bottom in the column (List Order – 33.6% of total trials); 2) selection of 
conforming (CC), then partially conforming (PP), and finally nonconforming sequences 
(NN); (CCPPNN – 24% of all trials); and, 3) just the conforming triples (CC – 
10.2% of all trials).  For trial 10 the list order was CCPPNN – which matched both of the 
top two selection orders; therefore, data from trial 10 were excluded from the selection 
sequence analyses.  
Participants generally selected a search strategy and continued to use the same 





Table 4. Condition Time Comparisons 
Condition Mean (seconds) Std. Deviation N 
Disconfirm and Text – I1V1 792.37 257.25 20 
Disconfirm and Color – I1V2  836.03 293.14 18 
Many Rules and Text – I2V1  842.15 242.48 19 
Many Rules and Color – I2V2 770.89 329.72 20 
Total 809.28 278.88 77 
 
selecting the two most popular sequences - list order and CCPPNN, τb (Kendall’s tau_b) 
= -.59,  p < .001.   However, a multi-attribute analysis of variance (MANOVA) of the top 
three search sequences with instructions and text color as fixed factors, suggests that only 
instructions had an effect on search sequences; the CCPPNN selection sequence was used 
more often with the instruction to disconfirm the rule than the many rules instruction, F 
(1, 76) = 2.28, p = .037 (Disconfirm, M = 4.15; Many Rules, M = 2.23).  However, there 
was no correlation between the CCPPNN selection sequence and identifying patterns in 
the rule (hits) τb = -.05 p = .57 and eliminating distracter patterns (false positives) τb = -
.10 p = .24. There were no significant differences or relationships between the other 
conditions – list order selection sequence or the CC selection sequence and instructions 
or color and text conditions.   
Search Sufficiency 
Given that selection of just one conforming sequence was necessary and sufficient 
for identifying all patterns in the rule, all but 3 (99.7%) of the 1120 total searches were 
sufficient for identifying all patterns in the rule.  Selection of both conforming sequences 
and both nonconforming sequences ensured a sufficient search to identify distracter 
patterns and thereby eliminate them from the rule. Selection of the partially conforming 





overwhelmingly sufficient for eliminating distracter patterns (895 of the 1120 total 
searches, 80%); (see Table 5 and Table 6).  There was no significant correlation between 
any experimental conditions and search sufficiency, τb = -.02 p = .80.   
Search sufficiency also does not correlate with eliminating distracter patterns 
from the rule, τb = -.10 p = .24. However, an insufficient search where only the two 
conforming triples (CC) were selected is related to a failure to eliminate distracter 
patterns (false positives) τb = .21 p = .01.    
Discussion 
The data visualization manipulation of this experiment addressed the question, 
can increased salience of data characteristics reduce conformation bias and thereby 
improve performance, with the hypothesis that color can be more effective than text in 
identifying characteristics of evidence, and therefore replace text for increased search 
efficiency, sufficiency and decision accuracy. Contrary to the hypothesis, the data do not 
indicate any significant differences between any color and text conditions.  Using color to 
differentiate characteristics of evidence did not increase search efficiency measured by 
time. Nor did color affect the order that triples were selected. Both color and text 
conditions produced equally mediocre results for identifying patterns in the rule; the 
average for the 14 trials was approximately 66% - 68% over all conditions    
The instruction manipulation of this experiment addressed the question, can 
instructions to structure appropriate hypotheses and sufficiently consider data, reduce 
confirmation bias and thereby improve performance, with the corresponding hypothesis 
that instructions to perform a disconfirming search are more effective than instructions to 





Table 5. Sufficient Searches by Trial and Search Type 
Trial < 6 selected All 6 selected  List Order CCPPNN Total 
1 0 17 31 14 62 
2 2 17 28 20 67 
3 2 16 28 18 64 
4 2 13 31 20 66 
5 3 12 28 25 68 
6 4 12 27 16 59 
7 4 13 25 22 64 
8 5 22 22 20 69 
9 2 15 24 19 60 
10 1 7 55 Same as list 
order 
63 
11 4 14 29 17 64 
12 3 12 25 25 65 
13 3 18 24 19 64 
15 3 12 25 20 60 
Totals 38 200 402 81 895 
 
 
 Table 6. Insufficient Searches by Trial and Search Type 
  Trial CC only Cs + Ps 
no Ns 
Cs + 1 
N 
No Cs Total 
1 7 3 7 1 18 
2 3 5 4 1 13 
3 6 6 3 1 16 
4 6 4 4 0 14 
5 5 6 1 0 12 
6 10 9 2 0 21 
7 10 5 1 0 16 
8 8 3 0 0 11 
9 15 3 2 0 20 
10 12 3 2 0 17 
11 10 5 1 0 16 
12 11 4 0 0 15 
13 11 4 1 0 16 
15 12 7 0 1 20 





disconfirming evidence to test the rule was no better or worse than instructing 
participants to think of as many rules as possible.  Neither of the instructions were 
enough to ensure generation of appropriate hypotheses and sufficient consideration of the 
data; as evidenced by identifying on average less than 16 of the 23 possible patterns in 
the rule (69.6%) and failing to eliminate an average of 7 distracter patterns over 14 trials.  
In sum, the results show no difference in search sufficiency, accuracy or efficiency 
between the instruction conditions.  The only difference found between the instruction 
manipulations was the favoring of the CCPPNN selection sequence when participants 
were instructed to consider disconfirming data.  Although, the instructions may have 
affected the order evidence was considered, the CCPPNN selection sequence does not 
correlate with any change in identifying patterns in the rule or eliminating distracter 
patterns. 
Perceived Value  
The instructions to test the rule were intended to encourage participants to 
consider disconfirming evidence – perhaps by facilitating a switch from associative 
processing to rule-based reasoning.  A closer look at participants’ descriptions of their 
strategies revealed that only 25 (31.3%) of the 80 participants mentioned the value of 
disconfirming evidence for testing their rules.  Of those 25 participants, 12 (48%) were in 
the condition with instructions to test the rule using disconfirming evidence.  An almost 
equal number – 13 (52%) – of participants were in the many rules condition.  With no 
real difference between conditions, clearly the instruction to use disconfirming evidence 
did not increase the value participants placed on disconfirming evidence.  In fact, the data 





value in disconfirming evidence, with statements such as, “…as I went along, I realized I 
only needed to uncover the conforming numbers.”  All 7 participants who stated there 
was no value in disconfirming evidence were in the condition instructed to test the rule 
using disconfirming evidence.   
The remaining 55 (68.8%) participants who did not mention disconfirming 
evidence described their strategies in terms of finding the patterns for the rule with no 
mention of the data characteristics (conforming or nonconforming) that they considered.  
Participants overall disregard for disconfirming evidence is reflected in the lack of 
correlation between search sufficiency and accuracy.  Even though participant’s searches 
were overwhelmingly sufficient to reveal all the evidence needed to identify patterns and 
eliminate distracter patterns, it seems most participants lacked an understanding of how 
to use the evidence; as reflected in the failure to eliminate an average of seven distracter 
patterns from the rules over 14 trials. 
This experiment did not restrict how many triples could be selected. While the 
unrestricted search resulted in selections sufficient to discover the necessary evidence it is 
difficult to determine what data were actually considered – even after reviewing 
participant strategy descriptions.  Limiting the ability to select the data and asking 
participants to state what the rule could be after every selection might facilitate judging 
the perceived value of the data and what data were actually considered.  In addition, other 
methods of increasing the salience of data patterns might support discovery of the rule 










Previous studies using the Wason 2-4-6 task demonstrated that in addition to 
feedback on the triples’ adherence to the rule, the discovery of the rule was facilitated by 
displaying a graphical representation of the participant’s triple (Vallée-Tourangeau & 
Payton, 2008).  Experiment 2 continued to explore increasing salience of data 
characteristics to reduce confirmation bias and thereby improve performance.  
Specifically by using a graph to investigate the question, can increasing the salience of 
data patterns reduce confirmation bias and increase search efficiency, sufficiency and 
decision accuracy?  
This experiment included the presentation of a graph that reflected the three 
patterns associated with the rules: Providing line charts to increase the salience of 
ascending and descending patterns, the differences between numbers, and the patterns of 
odd or even numbers. The hypothesis was that increasing the salience of patterns related 
to the user’s task by presenting a graph reflective of these patterns reduces confirmation 
bias and the cognitive effort for comparisons; resulting in, a) increased search sufficiency 
– measured by selection; b) increased decision accuracy; and, c) increased efficiency – 





sufficiency and increased accuracy may result from a switch to more rule-based 
processing to generate hypotheses and sufficient consideration of the data; higher 
efficiency may result from supporting associative processing. 
Perceived Value of Evidence 
The results of Experiment 1 showed a lack of correlation between search 
sufficiency and accuracy; this raised questions regarding the perceived value of evidence.  
Pirolli (2007) explored search patterns and perceived value of data.  Pirolli’s information 
foraging theory compares the search for information to an animal foraging for food.  The 
analogy posits that the forager will pick off the most profitable items first and will limit 
their investment where they perceive little gain. Consistent with this analogy, the search 
selection sequences reveal the evidence the searcher considers the most profitable.  The 
items selected first are perceived as having the most value.  Items not selected are 
perceived to have less value or provide little to no gain.   
This experiment further explored the perceived value and consideration of 
disconfirming data.  Scarcity was manipulated by limiting the ability to select evidence, 
with the objective of encouraging a more profitable selection sequence.  To facilitate 
interpreting the perceived value and consideration of the data, participants were asked to 
state what the rule could be after every selection; in addition, they were asked about their 







Participants were recruited from the University of Utah psychology undergraduate 
student participant pool. Data were analyzed from 42 participants ranging in age from 18 
to 40 years (M = 23). There were 24 (57%) female participants and 18 (43%) male.  
Exclusions 
The procedure for testing color vision and determining data exclusion was 
identical to Experiment 1.  Participants’ data were excluded if the individual could not 
distinguish between the colors used later in the experiment to identify data 
characteristics. 
 In Experiment 1 participants selected all the triples and then entered the rule once 
for every trial.  For this experiment the participants were asked to enter what they thought 
the rule could be after selecting each triple.  There was only one rule per trial; however, 
entering a rule after every triple (up to 4 triples selected) was confusing to some 
participants.  Ten potential participants persistently misinterpreted the task as defining a 
new, separate rule for each triple.  Their data were excluded from analyses.  (See the Data 
Coding section for a more complete explanation of how the decision to exclude was 
determined.)   
Design 
The between-subjects design examined the impact of the independent variable 
with the two levels of salience: Presence of graph and absence of graph. The two 





data patterns reduce confirmation bias and increase search efficiency, sufficiency and 
decision accuracy?  
The software was modified for the conditions of this experiment.  As in 
Experiment 1, six boxes containing triples were presented in a column – triples were 
initially not visible.  When selected by the participant a triple was revealed in that box. 
The results of Experiment 1 showed color to be no more or less effective than text in 
identifying triples. Colors were used instead of text in this experiment to consistently 
correlate identifying the triples in the boxes with the same triples charted in the graph. 
Each of the boxes were identified as “conforming,” “nonconforming,” or “partially 
conforming” to a rule using color coding – green, yellow and red – to match rule 
conformation (i.e., green = conforming; yellow = partially conforming; red = 
nonconforming); (see Figure 8).    
Identical to Experiment 1, the boxes containing triples were positioned in pseudo-
random order, with a different order for every trial but consistent between conditions for 
each trial (i.e., the positions in the list for conforming and nonconforming triples differed 
between trials 1 through 15; however, the order of conforming and nonconforming triples 
in trials 1 through 15 were the same for all participants); (see Table 2). 
In the first condition (no graph) when each colored box was selected the 
associated triple was revealed (see Figure 8).  In the second condition (graph), when each 
colored box was selected, in addition to revealing the triple, the triple was charted as a 
line on a graph to the right of the boxes (see Figure 9).  The colors of the line chart 
corresponded to the colors identifying the conformance of the triple with the rule (green, 

















numbers were marked in orange (see Figure 10). Graphing was used to increase the 
salience of ascending and descending patterns, differences between numbers and 
odd/even patterns.  
Procedure 
As in Experiment 1, participants were greeted and given a color vision screening 
test. A research assistant (RA) logged in and entered a predetermined unique participant 
ID.  The RA directed the participant to read the instructions aloud.  Participants were 
encouraged to ask questions while they completed an example trial. Several participants 
questioned whether each triple was associated with a separate rule.  The RAs responded 
that each trial had only one rule and then re-read the task instructions to the participant, 
emphasizing that the participant’s task was “to discover the rule that defines the 
conforming sequences.”   
Participants interacted with the application by clicking on up to four of the six 
initially empty boxes. The boxes were identified by color as containing triples that, 1) 
conformed to the rule, 2) did not conform to the rule, or 3) partially conformed to the rule 
(two triples of each type).  Participants could select the boxes in any order 
After selecting a box, the triple appeared in the box and a dialog box appeared 
with instructions to enter what they thought the rule could be (see Figure 11).  After   





typing in a rule, participants clicked on the “OK” button and continued selecting boxes to 
reveal up to four triples.   
Selecting the “Continue” button displayed the text, “Write the strategy you used 
to determine the rule.  Click ‘Continue’ when you are finished.”  Participants then entered 
the strategy they used to determine the rule.  Selecting the “Continue” button again 
caused the correct rule to appear (see Figure 2).  After dismissing the dialog box 
containing the correct rule, the screen was reset to the next trial. After 15 trials the 
participants were presented with a set of questions requiring input into three response 
fields (see Figure 12 and Figure 13):  
 The first response field required selecting a “yes,” “no” or “unsure” to answer the 
question, “Did your strategy change as you did more tasks?”  
 The second response field required entering text to answer the questions of why 
their strategy changed or did not change and if their strategy changed, how it 
changed. 
 The third response depended on the experimental condition.  The participants 
responded to “Did the colors and/or graph help? Why or why not?” (graph 
condition); or, “Did the colors help you? Why or why not?” (nongraph condition).  
  

















After responding to the questions and selecting “OK,” the participants answered 
demographic questions – identical to the questions in Experiment 1 (see Figure 3). 
Measurements 
The following measurements were recorded in a database for each trial: 
Time. The time was recorded for participant actions: 
 When each triple was selected (made visible) 
 When the rule was entered for each triple 
 When the participant selected “Continue” after entering their strategy for each 
trial 
These measurements allowed comparison of the time for trials between and 
within participants, and for each experimental condition.  Search efficiency was 
measured by time. 
Rule. Participants were instructed to enter what they thought the rule could be 
after selecting each triple. The triples and rules were identical to the triples and rules used 
in Experiment 1. 
Search sequence. Identical to Experiment 1, when each triple was selected and 
made visible, the type of the triple – conforming, nonconforming or partially conforming 
– was recorded as well as the time of selection.  This facilitated determining the search 
sequence.   
Strategy.  The participant entered a description of the strategy they used to 
determine each rule.  The example trial differed from Experiment 1 in that the description 
of potential strategies was the same for both conditions of the experiment: “There are 





sequence (3-5-7) and think of possible rules for that sequence. You could hypothesize the 
rule is odd numbers with adjacent numbers differing by 2 and ascending numbers. 
Looking at other sequences can confirm or disconfirm that hypothesis. Other strategies 
may be more or less effective.  You are encouraged to develop your own strategies.”   
Data Coding  
The results of Experiment 2 were coded using the same methods and criteria as 
Experiment 1 with exceptions and details as described below. 
Rules 
The process for coding the “hits” and “false positives” in the participant rule 
responses was performed as described in the General Data Coding section. However, 
because the participants entered a rule after selecting each triple instead of coding only 
one rule per trial four attempts to define the rule were coded for each trial.  The selection 
sequences were also coded as described in the General Data Coding section.   
Times 
All times were calculated electronically using values captured and stored by the 
software application.  Time to determine the rule was measured from when the 
participant selected the first triple to when the participant selected the “Continue” button, 
before they entered their strategy for that trial.  Therefore, time measurements included 
the time to write the rule. 
Data Exclusion  
Giving participants four attempts to define the rule confused some participants.  





trial when participants questioned whether each triple was associated with a separate rule 
the RAs responded that each trial had only one rule and then re-read the task instructions 
to the participant; emphasizing that the participant’s task was “to discover the rule that 
defines the conforming sequences.”   
Participants demonstrated an understanding of the task by entering what they 
thought the rule was on the first attempt and on subsequent attempts repeated the same 
rule or added or dropped a pattern.  For example, a participant, with the ID = 456, on trial 
11 first selected the conforming triple “7-5-3” and entered the rule “descending odd 
numbers.” After selecting the second conforming triple “9-5-3” the participant re-entered 
the same rule – “descending odd numbers.”  After selecting the first nonconforming triple 
“2-5-8” the participant correctly changed the rule to simply “descending.”  
Ten potential participants (19%) failed to understand that there was only one rule 
per trial.  Their responses defined a separate rule for each triple selected regardless of 
whether the triple was identified as conforming or nonconforming.  For example, on trial 
11 a potential participant, with the ID = 457, first selected the conforming triple “9-5-3” 
and entered the rule “descending, odd.” After selecting the other conforming triple “7-5-
3,” (s)he reentered the same rule “descending, odd.”  However, after selecting the first 
nonconforming triple “2-5-8” (s)he changed the rule to “ascending.” After selecting the 
second nonconforming triple “1-3-5” (s)he changed the rule to “ascending, odd.” By 
defining a rule based on the patterns in the nonconforming triples the participant 
demonstrated a misunderstanding of the task. All data from potential participants who 






Search Sufficiency  
Selecting only one conforming triple was sufficient to identify all the patterns 
related to the rule. Participants had enough evidence to identify all the patterns in the rule 
for 99.8% of the trials – 1 participant selected only a partially conforming triple in one 
trial.  
Both conforming triples were selected in 619 (98%) of the 630 total trials. 
However, selecting all of the conforming and nonconforming triples may be necessary 
and was always sufficient for eliminating distracter patterns. A sufficient search for 
eliminating distracter patterns occurred in only 68 (11%) of the 630 trials.  There was no 
relationship between graph and no-graph conditions and search sufficiency τb =-.03. p = 
87.  Selection of the partially conforming triples was not necessary for a sufficient search. 
Accuracy 
A one-way ANOVA with graph, no graph as the between subjects factor indicated 
that graphing the triples had no significant effect on identifying the possible 24 patterns 
in the 15 rules (on the last attempt to define the rule for each trial), F(1, 40) = .77, p =.39 
(overall M = 17.27 (71.8%), SD = 2.90; no graph, M = 16.88 (70.3%), SD = 3.22; graph, 
M =  17.67 (73.6%), SD = 2.56).  There was also no significant difference in eliminating 
distracter patterns between conditions, F(1, 40) = .80 p = .38, (overall, M = 12.52, SD = 
2.76; no graph, M = 12.14, SD = 2.69; with graph, M = 12.90, SD = 2.84).  
Ascending and descending patterns were perhaps the most salient patterns 
represented on the graph. Not all rules included ascending or descending values as a 





t-test indicated no difference between the graph and no graph conditions in identifying 
the possible 13 patterns in seven rules, t (40) = -1.08, p = .29, (no graph, M = 9.62 (74%), 
SD = 1.86; graph, M = 10.24 (78.8%), SD = 1.87). In the eight trials where ascending or 
descending was a distracter pattern, the graph condition reflected significantly more 
difficultly in eliminating distracter patterns from the rule (on the last attempt), t (40) = -
2.49, p = .02, (no graph, M = 4.81, SD = .81; graph, M = 5.67, SD = 1.35).  
Overall, participants identified on average a maximum of 13.95 distracter 
patterns, SD = 3.20, and failed to eliminate 12.52 of those distracter patterns, SD = 2.76 
on the last attempt over the 15 trials.  Although the reduction was numerically small, a 
paired samples t-test showed the reduction was statistically significant, t (41) = 8.20, p 
<.001. Based on the last attempt per trial, participants overall accuracy for identifying 
patterns in the rule while eliminating all the distracter patterns was 3.13 of the 15 trials 
(20.9%).  
Time Efficiency 
For both graph and no graph conditions, participants’ average time per trial for the 
first three trials was significantly greater than the average time per trial of the following 
12 trials, t(41) = 7.6, p <.001 (first 3 trials, M = 148.73 s, SD = 61.54; last 12 trials, M = 
82.45 s, SD = 35.12); (see Figure 14).   
However, participants in the graph condition required significantly more time on 
the first three trials than participants with no graph, t(40) = -2.11, p = .04, (no graph, M = 
388.44 s, SD = 159.57; graph, M = 503.95 s, SD = 193.44).  There was not a significant 











t(40) = -.26, p = .79, (no graph, M = 1025.25 s, SD = 532.13; graph, M = 953.48 s, SD = 
279.61). 
Perceived Value of the Graph 
Participants in the graph condition were asked at the end of the session if they 
found the colors and/or graph helpful; participants in the no graph condition were only 
asked if they found the colors helpful (see Figure 12 and Figure 13).  Of the 21 
participants in the graph condition 7 (33%) found the graph helpful and 8 (38%) did not 
find it helpful or did not use the graph – 6 (29%) participants did not comment on the 
usefulness of the graph.  Participants’ responses on the usefulness of the graph included, 
“The visual of the graph allowed me to judge quicker and see correlations between the 
numbers and their sequences rather than having to envision them or do mental math” and 
“The graph only helped a little but I used it more as I did more tasks.”   
There was little numerical difference in identifying the possible 24 patterns in the 
15 rules between participants who perceived the graph as helpful and those who did not 
(on the last attempt); (graph helpful, M = 17.14 (71.4%), SD = 2.36; graph not helpful, M 
= 18.12 (75.5%), SD = 3.10). Overall there was no relationship between the perceiving 
the graph as helpful and detecting patterns related to the rule, τb = -.09. p = .23.  There 
was also little numerical difference in eliminating distracter patterns between participants 
who perceived the graph as helpful and those who did not (on the last attempt); (graph 
helpful, M = 13.86, SD = 4.10; graph not helpful, M = 13.00, SD =1.51).  In addition 
perceiving the graph as helpful had no correlation to eliminating distracter patterns, τb = -





Perceived Value of Evidence 
As previously described, the triples were initially not visible; however, six boxes 
were identified by color as containing triples that were conforming, partially conforming 
or nonconforming to a rule.  Participants could select up to four boxes in any order. The 
top four selection sequences were, 1) both conforming triples then both partially 
conforming triples (CCPP – 109 trials or 17.3% of all trials); 2) both conforming triples 
then one nonconforming and one partially conforming triple (CCNP – 95 trials or 15.1% 
of all trials); 3) both conforming triples (CC – 92 trials or 14.6% of all trials); and, 4) 
both conforming triples then one partially conforming triple and one nonconforming 
triple (CCPN – 74 trials or 11.7% of all trials).  The top four selection sequences 
accounted for 370 trials or 58.7% of all trials (see Table 7). 
All of the top four selection sequences included selecting both of the conforming 
triples first.  Two other selection sequences included selecting both of the conforming 
triples first (i.e., CCNN and CCN), for a total of 450 of the 630 trials (71%).  Participants 
selected triples in list order for 13 trials or 0.019% of all trials. 
Considering selection of triples without regard to order, the following were the 
most common selections: 
 Both conforming triples, one nonconforming triple and one partially 
conforming triple (CCPN, CCNP, CNCP, CNPC) – 184 trials (29%)  
 All conforming and partially conforming triples (CCPP, PPCC) – 132 trials 
(21%) 
 All conforming and all nonconforming triples (CCNN, NCCN, CNNC, 





Table 7. Experiment 2 – Selection Sequences 
Selection Sequence Participants 
Using 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Total trials % of Trials 
CC 18 1.00 13.00 5.11 4.56 92.00 14.6% 
CCNN 13 1.00 12.00 4.00 3.67 52.00 8.3% 
CCPP 22 1.00 15.00 4.95 4.82 109.00 17.3% 
CCNP 22 1.00 10.00 4.32 3.12 95.00 15.1% 
CCPN 25 1.00 12.00 2.96 2.68 74.00 11.7% 
CNCP 10 1.00 9.00 2.10 2.51 1.00 3.3% 
CCN 9 1.00 6.00 3.11 2.09 28.00 4.4% 
CNCN 6 1.00 2.00 1.67 .52 10.00 1.6% 
CNNC 2 1.00 3.00 2.00 1.41 4.00 0.6% 
CNPC 5 1.00 10.00 2.80 4.02 14.00 2.2% 
PPCC 3 1.00 15.00 7.67 7.024 23.00 3.7% 
NNCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NCNC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NCCN 2 1.00 1.00 1.00  2.00 0 
List Order  3   1.00  3.00 0.004 
List Order Trial10 10   1.00  10.00 0.015% 








This experiment explored the impact of salience and perceived value and 
consideration of disconfirming evidence.  The findings related to salience are discussed 
first and then the findings regarding perceived value. 
Salience 
Increasing the salience of data patterns by charting on a graph was expected to 
increase search sufficiency, decision accuracy and efficiency.  The findings are discussed 
in turn for each of these measures. 
Search Sufficiency and Decision Accuracy 
The graph condition failed to facilitate an increase in search sufficiency.  Overall, 
only 11% of the searches included selecting all of the disconfirming evidence. Since all 
the necessary data were rarely selected it is not surprising participants failed to eliminate 
an average of 12.5 distracter patterns over the 15 trials. Accuracy where all distracter 
patterns were eliminated averaged only 20%.  Considering only trials with sufficient 
selection, the accuracy when all distracter patterns were eliminated was not significantly 
different (p = .38) at 19% over all trials. Therefore, even when the participants selected 
sufficient evidence they rarely eliminated all distracter patterns. 
Despite the purported ability of graphical representations to increase 
comprehension of trends and relationships (see Few, 2006; Tufte, 2000; Wainer, 2005), 
the present results indicate that the proper interpretation of a graph’s values cannot be 
assumed.  Instead of increased decision accuracy there was no difference in identifying 






Charting values on a graph not only failed to increase efficiency, the graph 
condition results show decreased efficiency.  The increased time to consider the graph 
was reflected in the average time for the first three trials; moreover, the increased 
investment of time was not offset by any gains in efficiency in the subsequent trials.  The 
hypothesis that increasing the salience of patterns related to the user’s task reduces 
cognitive effort for detecting and comparing patterns was not supported. 
It is unlikely that the graphs in this experiment promoted switching from 
associative to rule-based processing.  In fact, the increased salience of ascending or 
descending patterns in the graph may have strengthened associative processing in the 
graph condition, as evidenced by the increased failure to eliminate ascending or 
descending distracter patterns from the rule. 
The presence of the graph did not support the generation of hypotheses or 
consideration of disconfirming data.  In sum, the results of this experiment provide 
neither evidence that increasing the salience of data patterns reduces confirmation bias 
nor reduces cognitive effort for comparisons. 
The lack of benefit from the graph could be due to poor representation in the 
graph and/or participants’ poor problem-solving skills and misunderstanding of task 
requirements (Jarvenpaa, Dickson, & DeSanctis, 1985). Participants’ lack of 
understanding the value of disconfirming evidence might also have contributed to the 





Perceived Value of Evidence 
Based on information foraging theory (Pirolli, 2007) one could conclude that 
conforming data were considered the most valuable since conforming triples were 
selected first in an overwhelming number of searches (71%).  In addition, disregarding 
order, all conforming triples were selected in 98% of the trials.  In contrast, both 
nonconforming triples were selected in only 68 trials (11%). Interestingly, ambiguous 
evidence was considered more valuable than potentially disconfirming evidence – based 
on the frequency of selecting both partially conforming triples (132 trials – 21%) nearly 
twice as often as selecting both nonconforming triples (68 trials – 11%). 
These findings are consistent with the propensity resulting from biases for 
insufficient consideration of the data. This experiment probed for insight into perceived 
value and consideration of data by asking participants about their strategies.  
Strategy 
Participants were asked after every trial for the strategy they used to determine the 
rule.  After the 15 trials participants were asked if their strategy changed and if it 
changed, how did it change?  Participant responses indicated a varied understanding of 
disconfirming evidence; ranging from complete dismissal of nonconforming triples to a 
stated recognition of their value.  Fourteen of the 42 participants (33%) stated they 
disregarded the nonconforming – red – sequences or did not find them helpful.  
Participants explained their disregard of nonconforming triples as typified by: “The green 
always told you the rules so I mainly kept checking those instead of wasting time and 
checking the red that wouldn’t tell you anything.”  “I also decided right off the bat to not 





rule.” “I knew in order to get the strategy a completely wrong answer wouldn't help so I 
never picked the red ones.” 
Ten of the 42 participants (24%) stated the nonconforming triples were helpful.  
However, their understanding was sometimes incomplete: “At first, I went green, green, 
yellow, red.  As I went, I found that green, then red was helpful, because you can quickly 
disconfirm many things via the discrepancy between them… Using 2 red boxes I found to 
be useless; you get all the information you would need from one red box, and then you 
don't get to choose a more helpful green or yellow.” A few participants seemed to arrive 
at what could be a successful strategy, typified by,  “After I did a few trials, I found that it 
was easier to use the red boxes to eliminate guesses, than to use the yellow boxes which 
may or may not conform to all the rules, and ultimately ended up confusing me more.”   
Search Sufficiency  
None of the participants conducted a sufficient search for all 15 trials. Twenty-
five participants (59.6%) had zero sufficient searches. Of the 10 participants who stated 
they recognized value in the nonconforming triples, totally sufficient search patterns of 
selecting two conforming and two nonconforming triples were followed in only 38 of 
their 150 trials (25%); (CCNN, CNCN, CNNC, NCCN). They were more likely to select 
both conforming triples, one partially conforming and one nonconforming triple (CCNP, 
CCPN, CNPC, CNCP) for a total of 64 of 150 trials (43%).  Therefore, even though they 
stated a positive perceived value for disconfirming evidence, their searches were 
nevertheless deficient. This search deficiency is reflected in the lack of correlation 





.11. p = .20. Therefore, perception of value is not reliable; even when disconfirming 
evidence was perceived as helpful there was no reduction in errors. 
This lack of correlation between perceived value and selection prompted a closer 
look at individual’s searches and stated strategies.  The highest level of search sufficiency 
was 12 of the 15 trials – achieved by only 1 participant.  However, that participant 
identified all the patterns in the rule and eliminated all the distracter patterns in only one 
trial.  Even though the participant discovered all 24 patterns in the 15 rules, (s)he failed to 
eliminate 14 distracter patterns. The participant explained the strategy as “… choosing 
the green then red boxes.  The one time I changed it up, it left me confused (choosing a 
yellow box.) So I stuck with what worked.”  Clearly their perception of “what worked” 
did not include eliminating distracter patterns.  The participant with the second greatest 
number of sufficient searches (11 of 15) performed slightly better by eliminating all 
distracter patterns in 4 of the 15 trials.   
The participant with the best overall results did not perform a single sufficient 
search.  Their search pattern of choice was a combination of two conforming triples, then 
one nonconforming triple and finally one partially conforming triple (CCNP).  This 
selection pattern started on trial 1 and was followed for all 15 trials.  The participant 
described the strategy as “…looked at the green box, determined what the rule could be, 
confirmed with second green box, compared it with red box, and looked for similarities 
with hypothesis with the yellow box to confirm once more.” This strategy allowed them 
to identify 18 of the 24 patterns (75%) in the 15 rules; however, they still failed to 





In summary, there was a lack of correlation between finding the nonconforming 
triples helpful and eliminating distracter patterns.  Examining participants’ strategies and 
search patterns revealed that a sufficient search strategy did not ensure eliminating 
distracter patterns, and the best overall results were obtained without a sufficient search. 
However, the suboptimal values of the “best results” clearly reflect the insufficient 
search.  
Disconfirming Evidence and Decision Accuracy 
Within Experiment 2, there was a lack of correlations between perceiving 
nonconforming data as valuable, search sufficiency and eliminating distracter patterns.  
This raised the question, does selecting disconfirming evidence make a difference in 
decision accuracy? This question led to a comparison of Experiments 1 and 2.  In 
Experiment 1 participants could select up to all of the triples.  Participants’ searches in 
Experiment 1 were overwhelmingly sufficient for eliminating distracter patterns (80%).  
Experiment 2 limited the search selection to four triples.  Limiting the number of 
selections had a dramatic effect on selection sequences.  To illustrate this effect, the 
selection of all items in the list from top to bottom (list order) was one of the top selection 
patterns in Experiment 1 (31.2% of all trials); the list order selection pattern all but 
disappeared in Experiment 2 (0.019%) trials; selecting only the conforming sequences 
(CC) increased from 10.2% in Experiment 1 to 14.6% of all trials in Experiment 2.  
Participants’ searches in Experiment 2 were overwhelmingly insufficient for eliminating 






 Despite there being no correlation between participants declaring that 
nonconforming triples were helpful and actually eliminating distracter patterns from the 
rule, there was value in selecting nonconforming triples: While there was no difference 
between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 in accurately identifying the patterns in 14 rules, 
t(120) = 1.46, p = .15 (Experiment 1, M = 9.42 (67.3%), SD = 2.04; Experiment 2, M = 
9.96 (71.1%), SD = 1.73); the decrease between Experiments 1 and 2 in searches 
sufficient to eliminate distracter patterns does correspond to a significant increase in 
failure to eliminate distracter patterns in 14 rules (on the last attempt), t (120) = -7.22, p < 
.001 (Experiment 1, M = 7.00, SD = 3.16; Experiment 2, M = 11.10, SD = 2.58). 
Therefore, regardless of the participants’ stated perceived value, selecting 
disconfirming evidence did result in increased use of the disconfirming data. This finding 
raised the question, if selection of all the necessary disconfirming evidence cannot be 
assumed in self-directed searches, can presenting sufficient disconfirming evidence 
reduce confirmation bias and thereby improve performance? 
A partial explanation of the disconnect between the positive perception of the 
disconfirming evidence and decision accuracy may be that selecting ambiguous evidence 
– partially conforming triples – was more compelling to most participants than selecting 
disconfirming evidence. Perhaps because the ambiguous partially conforming evidence 
was perceived as disconfirming. This suggests the question, can removing irrelevant 





EXPERIMENT 3 – NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, 
 AND ORDER 
Introduction 
Necessary and Sufficient Disconfirming Evidence 
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 revealed four potential limitations of self-
directed searches. 1) The selection of necessary disconfirming evidence cannot be 
assumed, regardless of the perceived value of disconfirming evidence. 2) The selection of 
sufficient evidence does not ensure accuracy; however, 3) insufficient selection of 
disconfirming evidence results in lower accuracy. 4) Selection patterns indicate that 
ambiguous evidence is considered more valuable than potentially disconfirming 
evidence.  All four limitations reflect tendencies to not select sufficient relevant evidence 
and to give undue consideration to irrelevant evidence.   
In response to these limitations Experiment 3 considered two questions: 1) Can 
presenting sufficient disconfirming evidence reduce confirmation bias and thereby 
improve performance; and 2) can removing irrelevant ambiguous evidence also improve 
performance?  
Order 
Presenting necessary and sufficient evidence without requiring a search raises 
other concerns, including order effects.  The order that evidence is presented has been 





are easier to recall than items presented in the middle of a sequential presentation 
(Ebbinghaus, 1913).  These order effects can impact decision making in multiple 
contexts, including legal and healthcare (Bergus, Chapman, Levy, Ely, & Oppliger, 1998; 
Walker, Thibaut, & Andreoli, 1972).   
In studies of clinical diagnoses some researchers argue for a recency effect 
(Bergus et al., 1998) – where the evidence presented last disproportionately affects the 
diagnosis.  Other researchers argue there is a primacy effect – the diagnosis is more likely 
to be based on the first evidence presented. However, the primacy effect may disappear 
with more experienced participants (Cunnington, Turnbull, Regehr, Marriott, & Norman, 
1997); such experience based effect is consistent with Wang and colleagues’ (2000) 
finding that “order effects in belief revision exist at the early stage of training when the 
confidence level is low and they tend to diminish and disappear later when the confidence 
increases.”  In addition, whether the impact of data is greater when presented first or last 
depends on many factors including the complexity of the stimuli, length of the series of 
evidence items, and the data’s subjective value for an individual (Hogarth & Einhorn, 
1992).   
The variation in participants, tasks and measurements for prior order effect studies 
does not provide definitive answers.  Indeed, the effect of the temporal presentation of 
data on hypothesis generation remains an ongoing question (see Englund & Hellström, 
2012; Lange, Thomas, & Davelaar, 2012; Rebitschek, Scholz, Bocklisch, Krems, & Jahn, 
2012). 
In summary, in the previous two experiments participants were allowed to select 





allowing direct comparisons between order conditions. This explored the question, how 
does evidence order affect the generation of hypotheses? Specifically, after viewing 
initial evidence, does providing evidence that may confirm the initial hypothesis solidify 
the decision so that disconfirming evidence is not adequately considered at a later 
time?   Conversely, does providing evidence that may disconfirm the hypothesis before 
offering confirming evidence promote sufficient consideration of the evidence?  What 
effect do other orders of presentation have on the accuracy of the decision?  The 
hypotheses were that presentation order affects hypothesis generation and corresponding 
decision accuracy in the following ways: 
 Providing confirming evidence first may solidify the hypothesis so that 
disconfirming evidence is not adequately considered – thus reducing decision 
accuracy (CCNN order).   
 Conversely, providing disconfirming evidence before offering confirming 
evidence may promote sufficient consideration of the evidence; however, 
providing disconfirming evidence too quickly may hinder the formation of a 
complete hypothesis (NNCC order) 
 Providing some confirming evidence, then disconfirming, and then more 
confirming evidence may increase the correct identification of patterns and 
support eliminating patterns that are not part of the rule (CNNC and CNCN).  
This may promote the most accurate decisions. 
 Providing some disconfirming evidence then confirming evidence will not be 







Participants were recruited from the University of Utah psychology undergraduate 
student participant pool.  Each participant individually completed one experiment in one 
session. Data were analyzed from 130 participants ranging in age from 18 to 45 years (M 
= 23).  There were 77 female (59%) and 53 male (41%) participants. 
Exclusions 
As with previous experiments, all potential participants were tested for color 
vision and their data were excluded from analyses if they could not distinguish between 
the colors used to identify data characteristics.   
Consistent with Experiment 2, the participants were asked to enter what they 
thought the rule could be after selecting each triple.  Again this confused some 
participants. Thirty-one potential participants (19% of participants) misinterpreted the 
task as defining a new, separate rule for each triple.  Their data were excluded from 
analyses.    
Design 
The one factorial between-subjects design examined the effect of the independent 
variable (presentation order).  The conditions were the six permutations for the 
presentation order of the two conforming and two nonconforming triples (i.e., CCNN, 
CNNC, CNCN, NNCC, NCCN, NCNC).  The conditions were used to examine the 
question, how does evidence order affect the generation of hypotheses?   
Consistent with Experiment 2, the triples were identified by color only and the 





basic strategy provided.  When each triple was presented the triple was also charted as a 
line on a graph to the right of the boxes.  The display of the graph was identical to the 
graph condition in Experiment 2: The colors of the line chart corresponded to the colors 
identifying the conformance of the triple with the rule (green, yellow or red).  Even 
numbers were marked on the graph in blue and odd numbers were marked in orange. 
Procedure 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants were greeted and given a color vision 
screening test. A research assistant (RA) logged in and entered a predetermined unique 
participant ID.  The RA directed the participant to read the instructions aloud while the 
participant completed an example trial.  
Unlike the prior experiments, for each trial participants were presented with an 
exemplar triple that conformed to the rule (see Figure 15).  The exemplar triple was 
unique to this experiment; however, it matched the patterns of the first conforming triple 
in 14 of the 15 trials (i.e., contained the pattern(s) in the rule and the same distracter 
pattern(s)).  Therefore, having an additional conforming triple provided no essential 
additional evidence.  The program controlled the order the triples were displayed. 
Specifically, four triples were revealed one at a time in a preset order – depending on the 
experimental condition – two triples that conformed to the rule and two triples that did 
not conform to the rule.  
The triples were presented to each participant in the same order for all 15 trials 
consistent with the condition (e.g., in the CNCN condition the participant saw a 
conforming triple (C), then a nonconforming triple (N), a conforming triple (C), and 











confirming and disconfirming evidence for identifying patterns in the rule and 
eliminating distracter patterns.  
Consistent with Experiment 2, the participants were asked to enter their current 
hypothesis on what the rule could be after every triple was presented.  After five attempts 
to define the rule, participants were asked to enter the strategy they used to determine the 
rule (see Figure 16).  After entering the strategy, selecting the “Continue” button caused 
the correct rule to appear.  After dismissing the dialog box containing the correct rule, the 
screen was reset to the next trial.  
After 15 trials the participants were presented with a set of questions regarding 
their strategy (identical to Experiment 2). All participants were also asked “Did the colors 
and/or graph help? Why or why not?”  Participants were presented with the same 
demographic questions as in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Figure 3). 
Measurements 
The following measurements were recorded in a database for each trial performed 
by a participant: 
Time. Since the triples were presented in a preset order, the time was recorded for 
only two participant actions: 
 After the rule was entered for each triple 
 After the participant had entered the strategy for each trial and selected 
“Continue” 
Rule. The rule measurement was identical to the measurement in Experiment 2, in 











viewing each triple.  The two triples identified as conforming and the two triples 
identified as nonconforming were identical to the corresponding triples used in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  Therefore, the rules were also identical.  
Strategy.  Even though the triples were presented in a preset order and no search 
and selection strategy was required, participants were asked to describe the strategy they 
used to determine each rule.  The example trial displayed the following text for all 
conditions of the experiments as a description of potential strategies: "There are multiple 
strategies for determining the rule, one strategy is to consider the given sequence (1-3-5) 
and think of possible rules for that sequence.  You could hypothesize the rule is odd 
numbers with adjacent numbers differing by 2 and ascending numbers. Looking at other 
sequences can confirm or disconfirm that hypothesis. Other strategies may be more or 
less effective; you are encouraged to develop your own strategies.”   
Consistent with the previous experiments, the purpose of the example text was to 
describe what was meant by a “strategy” without specifying what the participant’s 
strategy should be.  After completing 15 trials the participants were asked if their strategy 
changed, and if so how did it change.  
Data Coding  
The results of Experiment 3 were coded and interpreted using methods similar to 
the previous experiments.  Details and exceptions are described below.  
Rules 
The process for coding the rules was identical to Experiments 1 and 2.  All five 






All times were calculated electronically using values captured and stored by the 
software application. Time to determine the rule was measured from when the participant 
selected the “Continue” button to start the trial to when the participant completed the last 
attempt to define the rule. 
Data Exclusion  
Consistent with Experiment 2, giving participants multiple attempts to define the 
same rule confused some participants.  Thirty-one potential participants failed to 
understand that there was only one rule per trial.  The same percentage (19%) of 
participants in this experiment misunderstood the task as in Experiment 2.  Again, all data 
from potential participants who demonstrated this misunderstanding were excluded from 
analyses.   
Results   
Order 
Accuracy 
Overall, participants identified an average maximum of 19.74 of the 24 patterns 
(82.3%) in the rules over the 15 trials, SD = 2.42. Participants identified an average 
maximum of 15.26 distracter patterns over the 15 trials, SD = 2.67.  Participants reduced 
the distracter patterns from 15.26 to an average of 5.2 by the last attempt.  
A one-way ANOVA with the six presentation order conditions as a between 
subjects factor failed to show a significant difference for identifying the possible 24 
patterns in the 15 rules (on the last attempt to define the rule for each trial), F (5, 124) = 





eliminating distracter patterns between presentation order conditions, F (5, 124) = 1.73, p 
= .13 (overall M = 5.2, SD = 2.98).  Based on the last attempt per trial, participants 
overall accuracy for identifying patterns in the rule while eliminating all the distracter 
patterns was 8.48 out of 15 trials (56.5%), SD = 2.75.     
Time Efficiency 
An ANOVA with presentation order as the between subjects factor revealed no 
difference between presentation orders on total time, F (5, 124) = 1.31, p = .26 (see Table 
8). Consistent with Experiment 2, the time to complete the first three trials averaged 
significantly greater than subsequent trials, F (1, 124) = 22.28, p < .001.  There was no 
interaction of time on the trials and the presentation order, F (5, 124) = .48, p = .79.    
Necessary and Sufficient Disconfirming Evidence  
All participants were shown necessary and sufficient evidence for determining the 
rule and eliminating distracter patterns.  The attempts to define the rule were used to 
examine how hypotheses change as more evidence (each triple) was presented.  The first 
exemplar triple conformed to the rule and was sufficient to accurately identify all patterns 
in the rule.  The exemplar triple also contained at least one distracter pattern.  Over all 15 
trials, on the first attempt participants averaged identifying 16.36 of the 24 (68%) patterns 
in the rules (minimum = 9; maximum = 24).  After viewing all triples the average 
increased to identifying 18.75 of the 24 (78%) patterns in the rules, (minimum = 12; 
maximum = 24).  A post-hoc analyses found this difference to be significant, t (129) = 







Table 8. Mean Total Time for 15 Trials by Order Condition 
Total Time    
Condition Mean Std. Deviation N 
CCNN 1423.80 476.69 21 
CNCN 1148.38 355.31 22 
CNNC 1183.96 356.74 24 
NCCN 1344.09 482.12 20 
NCNC 1310.81 390.32 20 
NNCC 1285.42 429.73 23 







Sufficient versus Insufficient Evidence 
Experiments 1 and 2 revealed limitations related to self-directed searches.  The 
effect of sufficient versus insufficient disconfirming evidence was examined by 
comparing Experiments 2 and 3. Because all of the conforming and nonconforming 
triples were presented in all trials for Experiment 3, all participants had sufficient 
evidence to determine the patterns for the rule and to eliminate any distracter patterns.  
Participants in Experiment 2 selected up to four of the six triples.  Only 11% of the 
searches included selecting all necessary and sufficient evidence – two conforming and 
two nonconforming triples.  None of the participants’ searches in Experiment 2 were 
sufficient for every trial.  
Participants in Experiments 3 identified significantly more patterns related to the 
rule on their last attempt to define the rule F(1, 170) = 9.02, p < .01, (Exp 2, M = 17.27, 
SD = 2.90; Exp 3, M = 18.75, SD = 2.75). On average, participants in Experiment 3 also 
identified more distracter patterns before the final attempt, F (1, 170) = 6.91, p < .01, 
(Exp 2, M = 13.95, SD = 3.20; Exp 3, M = 15.26, SD = 2.67).  In addition, participants in 
Experiment 3 eliminated more distracter patterns by the last attempt, F (1, 170) = 198.42, 
p < .001 (Exp 2, M = 12.52, SD = 2.76; Exp 3, M = 5.20, SD = 2.98).  Experiment 3 also 
had significantly higher accuracy with trials that eliminated all distracter patterns, F(1, 
170) = 143.02, p < .001 (Exp 2, M = 3.13, SD = 1.60; Exp 3, M = 8.48, SD = 2.75). 
Having an exemplar triple in Experiment 3 resulted in having three conforming 
triples and provided participants a potential advantage by giving them one additional 
attempt to define the rule.  A subset of Experiment 3 data was examined to provide a 





triples.  Specifically, the fourth attempt (of five attempts) to define the rule in Experiment 
3 with conditions ending with conforming sequences (i.e., CNNC, NNCC, NCNC) was 
compared to the last attempt (of four attempts) to define the rule in Experiment 2 trials. 
This analysis showed participants identified essentially the same number of patterns 
related to the rule on their fourth attempt to define the rule, p = .673, (Exp 2, M = 17.24 
(71.8%), SD = 2.90; Exp 3, M = 17.55 (73.1%), SD = 3.59).  Likewise, participants 
identified a similar maximum number of distracter patterns before the fourth attempt, p = 
.284, (Exp 2, M = 13.95, SD = 3.20; Exp 3, M = 14.56, SD = 2.65).  The analysis was 
biased against the Experiment 3 subset for eliminating distracter patterns since the second 
conforming pattern was the only way to eliminate one distracter pattern in two of the 15 
trials.  However, participants in Experiment 3 still eliminated significantly more 
distracter patterns than participants in Experiment 2 on the fourth attempt, F(1, 108 ) = 
43.86, p < .001, (Exp 2, M = 12.52, SD = 2.76; Exp 3, M = 7.82, SD = 4.05).  The 
Experiment 3 subset also maintained greater accuracy with trials eliminating all distracter 
patterns, F(1, 108) = 41.66, p < .001 (Exp 2, M = 3.13, SD = 1.60; Exp 3, M = 6.63, SD = 
3.27). 
Other Factors and Decision Accuracy    
A limitation noted in the prior experiments was that the selection of sufficient 
evidence did not ensure accuracy – given there was no difference in accuracy in 
Experiment 1 between sufficient and insufficient searches.  However, searches in 
Experiment 1 were overwhelmingly sufficient for determining the rule (80%).  
Presentation of evidence in Experiment 3 was 100% sufficient for determining the rule.  





evidence, comparisons of Experiment 1 and 3 explore factors other than search 
sufficiency.  
One difference between Experiment 1 and 3 was the number of attempts to define 
the rule. During Experiment 1 the participants selected up to six triples before attempting 
to define the rule; therefore, participants had only one attempt to define the rule for each 
trial.  During Experiment 3 an exemplar triple and then more four triples were presented 
in a preset order with an attempt to define the rule after each triple was presented. 
Participants in Experiment 3 had five attempts to define each rule. 
Comparing the attempts to define the rules in Experiment 1 to the first attempt to 
define the rules in Experiment 3 (both without trial 14) showed no difference in 
identifying patterns in the rule, F(1, 208) = .264, p = .61 (Exp 1, M = 15.67, SD = 3.26; 
Exp 3, M = 15.42, SD = 3.51).  On the last attempt in Experiment 3 participants 
eliminated significantly more distracter patterns than participants in Experiment 1, F (1, 
208) = 38.69, p < .001, (Exp 1, M = 7.0, SD = 3.16; Exp 3, M = 4.52, SD = 3.57).  
Discussion 
Some potential limitations of self-directed searches are, the selection of necessary 
disconfirming evidence cannot be assumed, regardless of the perceived value of 
disconfirming evidence; the selection of sufficient evidence does not ensure accuracy; 
however, insufficient selection of disconfirming evidence results in lower accuracy.  
These limitations raised the question, can presenting sufficient disconfirming evidence 
reduce confirmation bias and thereby improve performance?  A further potential 
limitation of self-directed searches is that greater selection of partially conforming triples 





evidence. This misperception of value led to the question, can removing irrelevant 
ambiguous evidence improve performance?  Addressing these questions required 
presenting information, rather than allowing participants’ self-directed searches.  
Presenting information raised concerns of order effects.  The consideration of potential 
order effects are discussed first, then efforts to overcome self-directed search limitations.  
Order 
Despite predictions of order effects, Experiment 3 did not reveal any differences 
in accuracy or efficiency based on evidence presentation order.  There are multiple 
possibilities for this lack of effect. For instance, the small number of triples and their 
short length may not have taxed working memory sufficiently to create differences 
between conditions; in addition, the triples remained visible after they were presented 
reducing memory requirements.  Another possibility is the task was not complex; 
participants’ familiarity with numbers and patterns may have reduced tendencies to 
utilize strategies to relieve cognitive strain associated with order (Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1993).  Task difficulty is not the only factor that contributes to order effects. 
Simple word sequences can produce order effects.  For example, persons described as 
“intelligent – tall – mean” may be judged more favorably than if described as “mean – 
tall – intelligent” (see Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992).  This word order example illustrates 
that the response to evidence order may be an affective response.  However, for the 
present study the nondescriptive numbers were unlikely to elicit affective responses, 
since the numbers did not correspond to trait adjectives for making social judgments of 





order appears to have had no effect on the hypotheses generated in this experiment, nor 
on time required to complete trials. 
Necessary and Sufficient Disconfirming Evidence 
Sufficient versus Insufficient Evidence 
One comparison of interest between Experiments 2 and 3 is the effect of evidence 
sufficiency on accuracy. However, before sufficiency comparisons can be examined, the 
design similarities and differences should be considered as potential confounding factors: 
The designs of Experiments 2 and 3 were similar in that both included identifying triples 
by color. One design difference was that half of the participants in Experiment 2 were 
presented with a graph, while all of the participants in Experiment 3 were presented with 
a graph.  However, the results of Experiment 2 showed no accuracy differences between 
the graph and nongraph conditions. Another design difference was participants in 
Experiment 2 were able to select up to four triples in a self-directed search, versus 
Experiment 3’s preset presentation of the same four triples; however, in both experiments 
participants attempted to define the rule after each triple.  Given the graph conditions’ 
lack of effect on accuracy, comparisons of these two experiments may reflect selection 
versus presentation of evidence; however, more likely, differences reflect the effects of 
sufficient versus insufficient disconfirming evidence. 
There was a large difference in considering sufficient evidence between the two 
experiments. Participants’ searches in Experiment 2 were overwhelmingly insufficient 
(89%) to eliminate distracter patterns; furthermore, none of the participant’s searches 





in Experiment 3 were presented with sufficient evidence to determine the rule and 
eliminate distracter patterns for every trial.  
Because participants in both Experiment 2 and 3 had sufficient evidence for 
identifying patterns in the rule, there was no significant difference in identifying those 
patterns (p = .673).  However, even though participants in Experiment 2 and 3 identified 
a similar maximum number of distracter patterns (p = .284), the lack of sufficient 
evidence made a significant difference in eliminating distracter patterns from the rule (p 
<.001).  One response to the question, can presenting sufficient disconfirming evidence 
improve performance, is clearly that having sufficient disconfirming evidence improves 
performance – as shown by the increase in eliminating distracter patterns from the rule.  
Other Factors and Decision Accuracy     
Having sufficient evidence is necessary, but having sufficient evidence does not 
ensure eliminating distracter patterns.  Participants in Experiments 1 and 3 were all 
overwhelmingly shown sufficient evidence to identify patterns in the rule and eliminate 
distracter patterns. As with the comparison of Experiment 2 to 3, there was no difference 
between Experiments 1 and 3 in identifying patterns in the rule (p = .61).  However, 
participants in Experiment 3 eliminated significantly more distracter patterns than 
participants in Experiment 1 after viewing all the evidence (p <.001). 
There are multiple potential explanations for the increased accuracy of 
Experiment 3.  One explanation is the difference in design factors between Experiments 1 
and 3. First, the wording of the instructions differed slightly; however, the task was 
identical – to discover the rule related to patterns in the triples. Second, the designs also 





all participants in Experiment 3 identified triples by color.  In addition, none of the 
participants in Experiment 1 were shown a graph, while all of the participants in 
Experiment 3 were shown a graph. While these factors had the potential to affect the 
results of between experiment comparisons, these factors – instructions, color and graph 
conditions – were unlikely to produce differences since they did not produce any 
significant differences within Experiments 1 and 2.   
Another explanation of the accuracy differences between Experiments 1 and 3 is 
that presenting sufficient disconfirming evidence rather than self-directed searches 
possibly improved performance (increased elimination of distracter patterns).  At a 
minimum, comparisons show that presenting sufficient disconfirming evidence is at least 
as effective as selecting disconfirming evidence. However, simply presenting versus 
selecting evidence might not be the only factor contributing to differences. To address the 
question, can removing irrelevant ambiguous evidence improve performance, 
Experiments 1 and 3 also differed in that Experiment 3 did not present the evidence 
identified as ambiguous (partially conforming). Another difference between the 
experiments is that Experiment 3 provided multiple attempts to define the rule.  These 
factors, removal of ambiguous evidence and multiple attempts, are discussed below.  
Ambiguous Evidence 
Based on the results comparisons of Experiments 1 and 2, one could conclude that 
the presence of ambiguous evidence is a distraction that reduces the ability to formulate 
an accurate rule. This provides a potential explanation for the differences between 
Experiments 1 and 3 for participants eliminating distracter patterns from the rule even 





conclusion is that the presence of ambiguous evidence is especially detrimental since 
ambiguous evidence is favored over disconfirming evidence thereby significantly 
reducing the ability to formulate an accurate rule.  This overvaluation of ambiguous 
evidence provides an explanation for the insufficient searches and results of Experiment 
2.  Selection of higher valued ambiguous evidence reduced selection of disconfirming 
evidence thereby reducing the elimination of distracter patterns. Thus providing a 
potential answer of “yes” to the question, can removing irrelevant ambiguous evidence 
also improve performance? 
Multiple Attempts 
Another factor emerged when analyzing the result differences between 
Experiments 1 and 3. Comparisons between experiments and attempts within trials 
suggest that multiple attempts to define the rule result in better decisions even with no 
change in sufficient evidence.  Specifically, participants in Experiment 1 had only one 
attempt to define the rule – after selecting up to six triples – while participants in 
Experiment 3 had five attempts to define the rule for each trial. As previously stated, 
there was no difference in identifying patterns in the rule on the first attempt between 
Experiments 1 and 3 (p = .61).  This is not too surprising since all evidence for 
identifying patterns in the rule was available with a single conforming triple.  However, 
identifying patterns in the rule increased significantly from the first attempt to the last in 
Experiment 3, t(129) = 9.312, p <.001 (First attempt M = 16.36; last attempt M = 18.75) – 
even with no change in sufficient evidence.  Multiple attempts to define the rule clearly 





Continued Suboptimal Performance 
 Removing irrelevant ambiguous evidence and providing multiple attempts to 
define the rule markedly improved overall performance in Experiment 3.  However, not 
all participants benefited from multiple attempts to define the rule. For 51% of the trials 
participants identified all patterns in the rule on the first attempt.  Leaving 49% of the 
trials with potential for improvement.  However, the overall significant increase between 
the first and last attempt for identifying patterns in the rule was due to an increase in only 
20.2% of the trials. Furthermore, the increase came after offsetting the 4.6% of the trials 
where participants identified fewer patterns in the rule on the last attempt.  
A review of the data for eliminating distracter patterns from the rule also revealed 
individual differences between subsequent attempts.  During Experiment 3, after viewing 
the first triple, subsequent triples provided disconfirming evidence for eliminating 
distracter patterns. At least one distracter pattern was identified on the first attempt in 
72% of the trials.  In 43.4% of the trials participants did not eliminate any distracter 
patterns between the first and last attempts to define the rule.  For a nearly equal amount 
(43.9%) of trials participants eliminated one distracter pattern, and for 7.7% of trials 
participants eliminated two distracter patterns between the first and last attempt. In the 
remaining 5.1% of trials participants added at least one distracter pattern between the first 
and the last attempts to identify the rule.  In summary, despite providing disconfirming 
evidence, for 49% of trials no distracter patterns were eliminated between the first and 
last attempts to define the rule. Why did multiple attempts help some participants and not 
others? What other factors should be considered in efforts to improve decision support?  






At the end of the 15 trials participants were asked if their strategy changed and 
why.  If their strategy did change they were asked to explain how it changed. The 
majority of participants (91, 70%) reported a change in strategy; 32 participants (24.6%) 
reported no change in strategy.  Seven participants (5.4%) responded with “not sure.”  
Some participant’s explanation of their strategies were nonspecific responses such as, “It 
changed based on what went wrong in previous tasks.” A characteristic of the associative 
system is that the person “is conscious only of the result of the computation, not the 
process” (Sloman, 1996).  An associative process correlates to some participants’ 
description of their strategy exemplified by, “Most patterns I could just look at and see 
the pattern or what the numbers were doing.” 
Elimination of distracter patterns requires deliberation, analysis and verification. 
Some participants articulated a more insightful awareness of a rule-based strategy, 
typified by, “I started including every possible part of the rule on the first green, and then 
eliminating as the other sequences were shown” and “All I did was come up with all 
possible rules with the first green box and used the other four boxes to eliminate any rule 
that did not apply.” This Find All Then Eliminate (FATE) strategy was explicitly 
expressed by 15 participants (11.5%). Participants who expressed their strategies as a 
rule-based FATE strategy developed more accurate rules than other participants, as 
shown by a MANOVA analysis considering the patterns identified on the first attempt 
and the distracter patterns remaining on the last attempt, F (2, 127) = 3.46, p = .03.  The 
FATE strategy resulted in eliminating more distracter patterns from the rule by the last 





difference in identifying the 24 patterns in the 15 rules on the first attempt, F (1, 128) = 
.03, p = .86 (FATE, M=16.2 (67.5%); All others, M = 16.4 (68.3%)). 
These results raised the question that if participants identify more patterns (both 
patterns in the rule and distracter patterns) on the first attempt are they more likely to 
identify patterns in the rule and eliminate more distracter patterns after all the evidence 
has been presented?  One hypothesis is that identifying all possible patterns in the first 
triple frees up cognitive resources and supports a switch to rule-based processing that 
uses the rest of the triples to eliminate distracter patterns. A correlation analysis supports 
this hypothesis in that identifying patterns in the rule correlates positively with 
identifying distracter patterns on the first attempt, τb = .45, p <.001. Further, that more 
distracter patterns are eliminated if found early is shown by the correlation between the 
number of distracter patterns found on the first attempt and the increase in accuracy with 
all distracter patterns eliminated by the last attempt τb (130) = .15, p = .02.    
Summary 
The results of Experiment 3, in conjunction with comparisons to Experiments 1 
and 2, suggest affirmative answers: Presenting sufficient disconfirming evidence does 
have the potential to reduce confirmation bias and improve performance; in addition, 
removing (or not presenting) ambiguous evidence may also improve decision making 
performance.   
These answers do not provide a complete solution for supporting overcoming 
confirmation bias. Furthermore, the hypothesis that identifying all possible patterns in the 
first triple frees up cognitive resources and supports a switch to rule-based processing 





like the FATE strategy to facilitate the switch from associative to rule-based processing. 
Providing or requiring multiple attempts may support a switch to more rule-based 
processing, but, in this research did not ensure the switch (since providing for multiple 
attempts did not ensure greater accuracy for all participants).  Perhaps rule-based 
processing requires more effort than some participants were willing to expend or 






This research explored data presentation and human cognition with the objective 
of improving electronic decision support systems.  Electronic decision support remains a 
concern because in spite of 60 years of effort, electronic computing has failed to reliably 
replace human cognition in complex domains.  Some factors in this failure are that 
suboptimal properties of the data and complexities of the domain often require human 
interpretation and intervention. Human interpretation relies on experience, values, 
intuition, insight and learning, which can lead to shortcuts or heuristics.  Heuristics in the 
correct context can be economical and effective in solving many problems. However, 
cognitive biases are failed heuristics that can lead to errors. Biases all share the elements 
of structuring incorrect or inappropriate models and hypotheses and/or insufficient 
consideration of the data.  Most if not all biases can be linked to confirmation bias – 
which is manifested by searching for only confirming data.   
The present research explored de-biasing techniques to shift cognitive processing 
from an automatic associative mode to a more deliberate, conscious rule-based mode. 
The general question was when and how to facilitate the shift in the context of decision 
support. The experiments are summarized in the next section, followed by sections on 





Summary of Experiments and Findings 
Experiment 1  
All three experiments were adaptations of the Wason 2-4-6 task. The first 
experimental design addressed two questions: Can increased salience of data 
characteristics reduce confirmation bias and thereby improve performance; and, can 
instructions to structure appropriate hypotheses and consider data sufficiently, reduce 
confirmation bias and thereby improve performance?  
Experiment 1 results were inconclusive on the question of using increased 
salience of data characteristics to reduce confirmation bias. With an unrestricted search 
participants typically selected all available evidence, and neither increased salience of 
data characteristics (using color versus text) nor instructions (to consider disconfirming 
evidence versus generating multiple hypotheses) affected their search sufficiency, 
efficiency or decision accuracy.  Moreover, instructions to consider disconfirming 
evidence did not increase the perceived value of disconfirming evidence. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2’s design limited the ability to select data, to manipulate scarcity, 
and facilitated judging participants’ perceived value of the data.  The experiment also 
examined the effect of increased salience of data patterns by comparing charting data on 
a graph versus no graph. Charting the data on a graph did not increase selection of 
disconfirming data, nor did it change decision accuracy.  The only measured effects of 
the graph were an increase in the amount of time participants required to complete the 
study and an increased failure to eliminate ascending or descending distracter patterns 





The results of restricting the search to manipulate scarcity does provide insight 
into what evidence was considered most valuable.  Not surprisingly, conforming data 
were considered the most valuable (all conforming data were selected in 98% of trials).  
Interestingly, ambiguous evidence was considered more valuable than potentially 
disconfirming evidence – all ambiguous evidence was selected nearly twice as often as 
disconfirming data. Even when disconfirming evidence was perceived as valuable, 
participants still selected more ambiguous evidence than disconfirming evidence.  
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 led to four conclusions on potential limitations 
of self-directed searches: 1) The selection of necessary disconfirming evidence cannot be 
assumed in self-directed searches, regardless of the perceived value of disconfirming 
evidence. 2) The selection of sufficient evidence does not ensure accuracy regardless of 
the perceived value; however, 3) insufficient disconfirming evidence does result in lower 
accuracy. The corollary is the presence of disconfirming evidence does result in increased 
accuracy. 4) Selecting ambiguous evidence may be more compelling than selecting 
disconfirming evidence. The selection of ambiguous evidence over truly disconfirming 
evidence can be detrimental.  The preference for ambiguous evidence over disconfirming 
evidence is shown regardless of the stated value of disconfirming evidence, perhaps 
because ambiguous evidence is perceived as disconfirming. 
Experiment 3  
In response to the limitations of self-directed searches, two questions were 
considered in Experiment 3: 1) Can presenting sufficient disconfirming evidence reduce 





ambiguous evidence also improve performance? Presenting evidence rather than allowing 
self-directed searches raised concerns and suggested hypotheses for order effects. 
Experiment 3 failed to produce the hypothesized order effects.  However, the 
results of Experiment 3 support the conclusion that having sufficient disconfirming 
evidence reduces confirmation bias – resulting in improved performance. Further, that 
presenting sufficient disconfirming evidence is at least as effective as selecting 
disconfirming evidence.  
In response to the second question, can removing irrelevant ambiguous evidence 
improve performance, the increased accuracy in Experiment 3 compared to Experiment 1 
may have resulted from removing ambiguous evidence or from requiring multiple 
attempts to define the rule or a combination of both factors. 
Regardless of the condition, accuracy increased for some participants but not 
others.  One explanation may be the strategy employed.  A find all possible rules then 
eliminate distracter patterns appeared to be the most effective strategy.  This suggests that 
identifying all possible patterns or diagnoses frees up cognitive resources and supports a 
switch to rule-based processing that uses subsequent evidence to eliminate distracters and 
refine the conclusions. The FATE strategy may explain differences between 
performances in terms of associative and rule-based processing, however, the question 
remains of how to promote the switch from associative to rule-based processing.  
Implications for Decision Support Systems 
Reliance on Increased Salience   
Increasing the salience of data patterns does not ensure increased search 





(DSS) should not rely exclusively on increased salience to improve search performance.  
Prior research (Kramer, 2010) showed that manipulating salience of evidence – by size 
and/or position – may increase search efficiency but generally fails to increase search 
sufficiency or decision accuracy.   This study is consistent in that increased salience by 
identifying patterns related to the task does not ensure increased search sufficiency or 
decision accuracy.  In fact, increasing salience of evidence through graphs can decrease 
efficiency and reduce accuracy.  The salience of the ascending and descending patterns 
not only failed to result in greater efficiency, but the potential support of associative 
processing possibly hindered a switch to rule-based processing. 
Instructions as a Method to Debias Search 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that instructions to consider disconfirming 
evidence were ineffective and therefore did not achieve the desired de-biasing effect. 
There are likely multiple reasons for the instruction’s lack of effectiveness. One reason 
may be that implementing the instructions to consider multiple hypotheses and/or 
disconfirming data requires domain knowledge (see Willingham, 2008). Therefore, in 
addition to instructing the user to consider multiple perspectives, designers of a DSS 
should carefully consider whether the user has the prior domain knowledge. For example, 
it is logical that a physician or any other domain expert must have knowledge of 
alternative hypotheses, expected measurements and observations before performing an 
adequate differential diagnosis and eliminate diagnoses that do not conform to the 
evidence. That designers of a DSS should carefully consider whether the user has the 





assumption of domain knowledge may provide partial explanation for the failure of some 
decision support systems.  
The findings of the present research reflect the mixed efficacy findings of other 
research exploring instructions and training to de-bias decision making (see Lilienfeld et 
al., 2009).  Facilitating the switch to rule-based processing may require directed and 
substantial effort since associative cognition is typified by the person being “conscious 
only of the result of the computation, not the process” (Sloman, 1996).     
Perceived Value and Search Sufficiency 
Designers of DSS should ensure that disconfirming evidence not only be 
available, but presented to the user. Experiment 2 results reflect that when resources are 
limited, searches are rarely sufficient even when disconfirming evidence has perceived 
value. However, regardless of the perceived value there is a significant benefit to having 
sufficient evidence available.  
The concept of presenting disconfirming evidence along with any confirming 
search results is supported by Kayhan’s study (2013) where participants received 
recommendations to view disconfirming evidence (“recommendation” condition) or the 
search results incorporated disconfirming evidence even if only confirming evidence was 
sought (“incorporation technique” condition).  In the “recommendation” condition no 
participants viewed the disconfirming evidence and 75% indicated a valid relationship 
with the hypothesis.  In the “incorporation technique” 75% of the participants viewed the 
disconfirming evidence and 75% disagreed with the hypothesis.  Confirming and 





sufficient to eliminate errors. An important conclusion is that even if not requested, 
presenting disconfirming evidence can affect the decision. 
In addition to presenting disconfirming evidence, removal of ambiguous evidence 
that does not offer value may be beneficial, especially since the ambiguous evidence may 
be perceived as more valuable than disconfirming evidence and therefore be given greater 
and unwarranted consideration. 
Multiple Attempts and Rule-Based Processing 
Given sufficient domain knowledge, developing hypotheses may become an 
associative task; however, eliminating distracter models often requires a switch to more 
deliberate rule-based processing. Therefore, a DSS might increase accuracy by 
supporting generation of hypotheses and promoting a switch to rule-based processing 
through multiple attempts to reach conclusions.  This correlates to recommendations by 
Spengler et al. (1995) for clinical psychologists to slow down decision making, 
emphasizing the importance of making tentative judgments which are “repeatedly 
subjected to rejection.” The challenge for a DSS would be to address the situations where 
users have reached closure and would likely be frustrated with a system that appears to 
arbitrarily slow them down.   
Limitations 
Decision making is a complex cognitive activity and the study of decision making 
encompasses many domains with varied human factors and data sets.  Even with the 
limited focus of the present study there are known and likely unknown confounding and 





consideration of individual differences, the design of the task, and naiveté of the 
participants.  These limitations are expounded below. 
Individual differences were not measured in the present work. Multiple individual 
differences potentially affected the identification of patterns and elimination of distracter 
patterns. Individual differences based on factors such as, working memory capability, 
personality, values, motivation, knowledge, skill and experience, all potentially influence 
cognition and decision making (see Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Kanai & Rees, 2011; 
Klein, Phillips, Rall, Peluso, & Hoffman, 2007; Levin, Huneke, & Jasper, 2000; 
Venkatesh & Morris, 2000). Also, the need for cognitive closure is a trait that varies 
between individuals and situations, and is marked by a quick final decision with low 
tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity (see Choi, Koo, Choi, & Auh, 2008).  In addition, 
it may be that some individuals have more difficulty overcoming the associative 
recognition of patterns (Sloman, 1996) and are therefore less successful in eliminating 
patterns.   
There may be factors in the study itself that limit the interpretation and 
generalizability of the results.  The abstract study design may not generalize to real-life 
decision making contexts.  Specifically, the simplistic rules in this study may not 
correlate to the complexity of environments with conflicting, ambiguous and excessive 
data.  However, given the overall less than optimal performance in this study, it may be 
assumed that increased complexity is not necessary to reveal errors arising from 
confirmation bias. 
Another limitation of the present study is that participants were undergraduate 





simple task in this study, it is possible participants lacked the knowledge to recognize and 
eliminate distracter patterns. Domain experts may react differently than novices to 
increased salience, instructions, and/or familiar charted data.   
Future Directions 
Future work should consider applying the findings of this study to the design, 
implementation and validation of decision support systems.  Studies should be done with 
users who have domain knowledge. In addition, given the importance of disconfirming 
evidence, more exploration is required for when and how to present unsought 
disconfirming evidence.  Moreover, given the potential for distraction and overrated 
value, more attention should be paid to the effects of ambiguous evidence. Further 
consideration should also be given to the trade-offs between efficiency through 
associative processing and when and how to facilitate a switch to rule-based processing. 
Specifically, when the circumstances warrant, explore facilitating generation of multiple 
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